『인문학연구』제10집, 27-43쪽

ㆍ『인문학연구』제10집

무하마드묵타사르샴수딘ㆍ

Merleau-Ponty's Solution to the Mind-Body Problem

And Its Philosophical Implications

in T'oegye's Concept of Self-Cultivation

Muhammad Mukhtasar Syamsuddin*

* 한국외국어대학교 철학과 박사과정

【주제분류】 Comparative Philosophy

【주요어】 Mind-Body, Self-Cultivation

【요약문】 This study examines Merleau-Ponty's solution to the mind-body problem and its philosophical implications in T'oegye's concept of self-cultivation. The focus of this study is more on the ontological, epistemological, and ethical implications of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological solution to the mind-body problem for the self-cultivation that was particularly conceptualized by T'oegye in Songhak Shipto (Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning).

Moreover, this study is attempted not only to demonstrate how the phenomenological solution of the mind-body problem possible to be applied philosophically in T'oegye's concept, but also how Merleau-Ponty created a critical thought of the body that is comparable, if not a solution to the philosophical problems of T'oegye's self-cultivation thought.

I. INTRODUCTION

Philip Ivanhoe points out that moral self-cultivation is one of the most persistent and dominant issues explored by Chinese ethical thinker. T’oegye’s concept of self-cultivation examined here was influenced by Chu Hsi which along with Wang Yang-ming, their method of self-cultivation adopted in Korea. Paul Ricoeur has called Merleau-Ponty "the greatest of the French phenomenologist." Along with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty introduced phenomenological thought to France. Meanwhile, Kalton has claimed that it was T’oegye more than any other who set the pattern for the intellectual agenda that gave the Korean Neo-Confucian tradition its distinctive cast as it developed over the centuries. Philosophically, both Merleau-Ponty and T’oegye created ways of approaching the world in a manner that offers for thinking or perhaps constructive living is the ability for living in the world with the awareness that the world is not quite finished. Of course by that approach, it will be a new challenge to reveal how the philosophical thought of such thinker developed and changed over their era.

Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1993), p. 1

Sasoon Yun, Critical Issues In Neo-Confucian Thought: The Philosophy of Yi T’oegye, trans. Michael C. Kalton (Korea University Press, 1990), p. v

Kim Hyong-hyo writes in A Comparative Study of Yulgok and Merleau-Ponty, it is not an easy task to compare two thinkers. What is more, to compare two philosophies which belong to different cultural spheres far apart from each other chronologically and geographically may well be impossible in some respects. This attempt, as all other comparative studies, is apt to fall into the danger of playing with empty concepts. In the present study, as far as methodology is concerned, I assert that the main goal of this study is to find a new understanding of T’oegye’s concept of self-cultivation, namely, an understanding of T’oegye’s self-cultivation in the perspective of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of body, so the danger of playing in empty concept can be avoided. The result of the comparative study of Merleau-Ponty and T’oegye should be continued in analyzing the possibilities on how to apply the first to the second. In order to find a comparable work that is seemed not to be empty concept, Yuasa Yasuo’s work is also important to be considered here.

Kim Hyong-hyo, "A Comparative Study of Yulgok and Merleau-Ponty" (Korea Journal 15-8, August 1975), p. 32

see Yuasa Yasuo, The Body, Self Cultivation, and Ki-Energy, trans. Shigenori Nagatomo and Monte S. Hull (Albani: State University of New York Press, 1993)

The best way to initially indicate the similarities and differences in each philosopher’s thought is to select one statement presenting the "philosophical thought" focused thread permeating each philosopher’s text.

The first quote is the introductory statement to Merleau-Ponty’s early work, "The Structure of Behavior"by focusing on the issue of mind-body relation. Merleau-Ponty argues that being-in-the-world is a primordial existential category with regard to the distinction between mental and physical. A necessary condition for our drawing a mental-physical distinction is our exhibiting the existential structures of being-in-the-world. The mental-physical distinction is not found in immediate experience but is a product of reflection upon experience. Before reflection:

The unity of man has not yet been broken; the body has not yet been stripped of human predicates; it has not yet become a machine; and the soul has not yet been defined as existence for itself.

Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. A.L. Fisher, (London: Matheun, 1965), p. 188

The second quotation is a selection from T’oegye’s Songhak Shipto(Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning) by focusing on the human nature, and mind-and-heart. T’oegye notes that not only the nature and the feelings but also the intention (will) is fundamental aspects of the mind-and-heart.

The mind is the thing that combines principle and material force and governs the nature and the feelings. Therefore it is not only the intention that issues from the mind; the issuing of the feelings is also done by the mind. Principle is without form or concreteness as it fills and is perfectly held by the mind, it is the nature. The nature is without form or concreteness; as it broadly manifest and issues forth as a function in dependence on upon the mind, it is the feelings. That which, based on the issuing of the feelings, manages, calculates, and asserts that it must be like this or must be like that, is the intention.

The quote is from a letter to Yi Koengjung and is quoted in Kalton, To Become a Sage, Ten Diagram of Sage Learning, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 129

In the evaluation of both Merleau-Ponty’s Solution and T’oegye’s concept of self-cultivation, this study needs to necessarily answer several questions.  The questions are:

1.	What are Merleau-Ponty and T’oegye trying to accomplish by their work?

2.	What are the fundamental similarities and differences between the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and T’oegye?

3.	What are the philosophical implications of Merleau-Ponty’s solution to the mind-body problem in T’oegye’s concept of self-cultivation?

To answer the questions and to help clarify how each of those passages embodies philosophical thinking in uniquely different manners, I will proceed to highlight and summarize each philosopher’s key idea in this consideration beginning with Merleau-Ponty’s thought of mind-body problem and then T’oegye’s Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning.

1. MIND-BODY PROBLEM

When Merleau-Ponty says ‘The unity of man has not yet been broken’ he means pre-reflectively the human being has not been divided into mental and physical properties nor mental and physical substances. It is the reflective act of judgment, especially philosophical judgment, which produces the appearance of mind-body dualism.

Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 188

Merleau-Ponty identifies two kinds of mistake, one materialist and one dualist and idealist. Both mistakes are consequences of one big mistake common to materialists, idealists and dualist alike: the body being ‘dépoillé de prédicats humains’/‘stripped of human predicates’. The materialist mistake is to think the body as a kind of machine (‘une machine’). The dualist and idealist mistake is to define ‘soul’ as ‘l’existence pour-soi/‘existence for itself’.

Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 188

Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 188

Materialists, in their attempt to reduce the mental to the physical, either by denying the reality of the mental, or by translating mental predicates into physical predicates, or by identifying mental states with physical states, thereby assume that the human body is just a highly complicated physical object. In fact according to Merleau-Ponty, as we have seen, the body is not an object. The body is a subject: the subject of its own actions, experiences and acts of thinking.

Idealists and dualists, in their attempt to prove that the mental is not physical, either by denying the existence of the physical or by refusing to identify the mental with the physical, mistakenly thinks the subject can be mental. In fact, the subject is the body: not the inanimate objective mechanical body that I may observe in the external world but the living moving experiencing whole human body that one is: the body, so to speak, I am co-extensive with.

For Merleau-Ponty the body qua oneself exhibits the phenomenological-ontological property of being ‘pour-soi’/‘for itself’. This terminology, although given widespread use by Sartre in L’Etre et le Néant is Hegelian. Pour-soi and ‘en-soi is French translations of Hegel’s ‘für-sich’ and ‘an-sich’ in Phänomenologie des Geistes. The ‘an-sich/für-sich’ distinction is a distinction between two kinds of being. Something belongs to the realm of being called ‘for itself’if and only if it is a subject of thought or experience. Something belongs to the realm of being called ‘in itself’ if and only if it is the object of thought and experience but not the subject of thought or experience. Qua subject it can not be object. Although Merleau-Ponty’s terminology is Hegelian his ontology is not. According to Merleau-Ponty the pour-soi cannot be mental or spiritual but Hegel positively insists that the für-sich can only be mental or spiritual.

Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 188

Merleau-Ponty also denies that it is part of pre-reflective common sense that there are psycho-physical causal relations, at least between mental substances and body:

Naïve consciousness does not see in the soul the cause of the movements of the body nor does it put the soul in the body as the pilot in his ship.

Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, p. 188

2. TEN DIAGRAMS ON SAGE LEARNING

T’oegye wrote Songhak Shipto(Ten Diagrams of Sage Learning) as a handbook on self-cultivation for the young King. The text encapsulates the most important concepts of Ch’eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism and introduces the entire Neo-Confucian project, everything from cosmology and psychology right down to how to behave. The Ten Diagrams as a whole has traditionally been analyzed in one of two ways, primarily because T’oegye himself mentioned both these methods within the text itself. One way is to divide the diagrams into two parts, the first part being made up of the first five diagrams which address metaphysics, society and ethics, and learning. The remaining five diagrams, which deal with self-cultivation and "begin with an analysis and characterization of man’s inner life (psychology) and conclude with concrete practice (ascetical theory)," are seen as comprising the other half.

Kalton, To Become a Sage, Ten Diagram of Sage Learning, p. 26

In Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning and numerous other writings, he propounded his doctrine that li and ki arise in mutual correspondence. This theory touched off a vigorous debate among Choson Neo-Confucian scholars, which in the end led to extraordinary developments in the school's doctrines. In terms of theory, T'oegye propounded the view that li was dominant. However, instead of stopping at mere theory, he developed a practical teaching method aimed at personal cultivation. Neo-Confucianism is often called, simply, the "study of the Way." With a teaching that encompassed both theoretical reflections as well as practical cultivation, T'oegye can be said to have perfected this teaching. His Neo-Confucian thought gathers the brilliant practical ideals lying within each theory and puts them together to form a whole. In a sense, his theoretical doctrines form the starting point of the study of the Way, while his doctrine of practical cultivation represents its culmination.

To be better understand the Ten Diagrams, it is important to explore some philosophical statements developed since the Four-Seven Debate arising in the history of Korean Neo-Confucianism thought.

The debate started when Ki Tae-Sung (pen name Kobong, 1526-1572) expressed doubts about changes T’eogye had made in his "Revised Diagram of Heaven". T’eogye made a revised version of the diagram because he thought the distinction between principles and material force and the Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings seen in Chong Chi-un’s (1509-1561) "Diagram of Heaven" was far too sharp. All four of this concepts, as well as many others appearing in the Four-Seven debate, were introduced in Kwon Kun’s Introductory Diagrams, but in this case many were fined-tuned during the course of the debate. The relation of each of these concepts to the others was debated through a series of letters exchanged between T’oegye and Ki-Tae-sung over the course of several years.

General background information on the Four-Seven Debate in English can be found in Kalton, et. al., The Four-Seven Debate, , An Annotated Translation of the Most Famous Controversy in Korean Neo-Confucian Thought, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), especially pages xxvii-xxxiv

Both concepts, The Four Beginnings and The Seven Feelings, can be traced back to classical sources. The former is found in a passage in Mencius dealing with dispositions, the beginnings, and their necessity for being truly human. A list of Seven Feelings, on the other hand, appears in the Book of Rites. These are: desire, hate, love, fear, grief, anger, and joy. They represent the range of all human feelings. Equally important, though, was the association among Korean scholars of the Seven Feelings on this list with a passage in the Doctrine of the Mean—"The condition before joy, anger, grief, or pleasure are aroused is called equilibrium; after they are aroused and each attains proper measure, it is called harmony. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the universe; harmony is its universal path. This passage played a pivotal role in the development of Neo-Confucian psychology and also had important implications for self-cultivation.

Kalton, et. al., The Four-Seven Debate, p. xxvii

This quote is from chapter 1, v, 4 of the Doctrine of the Mean and is translated in Kalton, et. al., The Four-Seven Debate, p. xxvii

From the same standpoint of self-cultivation, T’oegye emphasizes, in his Four-Seven thesis, that a self-possessed state of mind should be maintained by "concentrating on one thing without departing from it," as well as by preserving its internal "refined" state. The whole process of cultivating reverential seriousness involves the external method of "concentrating on one thing" and the internal method of "being cautious and self-watchful." As T’oegye argues further, "Neither of these can be neglected. Regulating the exterior to nourish the interior is an even more urgent matter."

The quote is from a letter to Ki Myong-hon and is quoted in Edward Y.J. Chung, The Korean Neo_Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok, A Reappraisal of the "Four-Seven Thesis"and Its Practical Implications for Self-Cultivation, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 134

Edward Y.J. Chung, The Korean Neo_Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok, A Reappraisal of the "Four-Seven Thesis" and Its Practical Implications for Self-Cultivation, p. 134

II. METHOD

The methods with which I work and wrote this thesis consisted of:

a. Intense reading of Merleau-Ponty’s Structure of Behavior, Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible

b.  Intense reading of T’oegye’s Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning

c. Analyzing comparatively and doing critical evaluation on the philosophical thought of Merleau-Ponty and T’oegye.

III. RESULTS/CONCLUSIONS

After researching this topic for a large portion of an academic year and then letting my initial conclusions alone to see if they still check out with the research, I am confident I can make a more specific and concrete description of the way Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological solution to the mind-body problem and T’oegye’s concept share and differ from one another. To clarify my results and/or conclusions, I will cite several passages from Merleau-Ponty’s work and attempt to show its ontological, epistemological, and ethical implications in T’oegye’s concept of self-cultivation.

Merleau-Ponty's project was to identify the "origin of the object in the very centre of our experience." He concluded that this center was, quite simply, the body; hence his account of a human being as "intelligent subjectivity." His early work demonstrates the ways in which the philosophical tradition and its successors (notably cognitivism in psychology) had overlooked the centrality of the body in human experience. For him, bodies have their worlds, and understand their worlds, without recourse to "symbolic" or "objectifying function." Consciousness -- the "symbolic" or "objectifying" function -- does not direct the body's movements; these are directed instead by the intelligent body's connections with the world at hand. It is the body, not an occupying consciousness, which understands its world.

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2003), p. 82

Merleau-Ponty writes in The Visible and the Invisible; "he who looks must not himself be foreign to the world that he looks at. As soon as I see, it is necessary that the vision…be doubled with a complementary vision or with another vision: myself seen from without, such as another would see me, installed in the midst of the visible…" He then concludes, "It is that the thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their means of communication. It is for the same reason that I am at the heart of the visible and that I am far from it: because it has thickness and is thereby naturally destined to be seen by a body."

Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alponso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 134

Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 135

What is obvious from reading these passages is the possibility to reveal Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical thought that might be implicated in T’oegye’s concept of self-cultivation.

【참고문헌】

1. Primary Sources

Kalton, Michael C., To Become a Sage, Ten Diagram of Sage Learning by Yi T’oegye, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Adventures of the Dialectic, Northwestern University Press, 1973

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Yun, Sasoon, Critical Issues In Neo-Confucian Thought: The Philosophy of Yi T’oegye, trans. Michael C. Kalton, Korea University Press, 1990

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Cataldi, Sue L., Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space : Reflections on Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Embodiment, University of New York Press, 1993

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【국문요약】

메를로 퐁티의 심신 문제 해결과

퇴계의 자기수양 개념에서의 철학적 함의

무하마드 묵타사르 샴수딘

본 연구는 심신의 문제에 있어 메를로 퐁티의 해결방안과 퇴계의 자기수양개념에 있어 그것이 가지는 함의를 알아보는 것이다. 본 연구의 목적은 퇴계가 송학십도(Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning)에서 개념화한 자기수양에 대해 심신의 문제를 위한 메를로 퐁티의 해결방안이 가지는 존재론적, 인식론적, 윤리적인 함의를 살펴보고자 하는 것이다.

나아가서, 이 연구에서는 심신의 문제에 대한 현상학적 해결책이 어떻게 철학적으로 퇴계의 개념에 적용되었는지를 살펴보는 것뿐 아니라, 만일 그것이 퇴계의 자기수양사상에 있어 철학적 문제에 대한 해결책이 아니라면 어떤 방식으로 그와 비교되는 메를로-퐁티의 육체에 대한 비판적 사고가 만들어지게 되었는지를 알아보고자 한다.

【Key Words】 심신, 자기수양