Alice in Wonderland and its Language/Cultural Acquisition Towards Cognitive Culture System

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I. Introduction

This paper has the aim of theorizing the practice of learning by examining how effectively communicative the culture-based English acquisition is for those learning English as a Foreign Language. The underlying theory in this paper is that the characterization of the cognitive culture system may largely parallel that of the nature of universality in language. This research presumes which direct "cultural universal" is an effective and communicative way of teaching and learning, just as the "universal grammar" is an effective tool to learn English, especially for those who are EFL (Talmy, "Rethinking Linguistic Relativity," 3-11). As Chomsky proposed the Language System, which holds that language is part of the innately determined brain system of human species, I will propose a culture cognitive system in which the narrative functions work properly through a cognitive interaction between the producer and the perceiver. This paper will attempt to theorize the relationship between the cognitive culture system and the narrative cognitive system, which is the basic concept of both culture-based and brain-based English acquisition. Cognizing the narrative in order to cognize the culture is the driving motivation for English learners to improve their English in the classroom setting. I will exemplify some effective teaching strategies of the cognitive narrative in obtaining the linguistic and cultural cognition and in becoming involved in the culture cognitive system.

II. Cognitive System in Language and Culture

In the language-culture parallelism, I can note here that, of all the cognitive systems, only language and culture extensively exhibit the pattern of a universal abstract structure underlying a variability of instantiation determined by social groups (i.e. various particular languages and cultures). Despite such parallelisms, though, language and culture have evolved separately as distinct cognitive systems. The presupposition of cognitive science and the cognitive linguistics assume the existence of a mind that has produced the narrative, as well as of a mind that cognizes the narrative (Talmy, "Cognitive Culture System" 80-116).

On the lexical and the sentential level, our communication conveys many kinds of cultural meanings that add to, transform, or manipulate basic senses of words. The areas of meaning in our communication include cultural presuppositions, associational or extensional meanings, and uses of words to carry symbolic or ideological content. The concept of 'cultural presupposition' refers to the fact that participants in speech interactions come to encounter an array of knowledge and understanding (models) of their culture as expressed and transmitted through language. The relevance of some of this shared knowledge is fairly obvious. One is that the presuppositions are collected by people during their lifetime of involvement and learning through experiences, that is, their enculturation. Another is that all human experiences are cultural; a tremendous amount of accumulated but unstated knowledge is continuously rooted within us (Bonvillain, 65).

Here are good examples of greeting usages in English: "How are you," "Hi," or "What's happening?" In American society, when two acquaintances meet, they may use the greeting "How are you," but do they actually want a substantive answer to this question? In casual encounters between acquaintances, a response that reveals personal problems or serious illness would be considered highly inappropriate. In order for participants to behave in an acceptable manner, they have to know the social purpose of particular words or utterances. In this example, EFL students must know that an utterance that has been expressed in interrogative form is actually not intended as a question, that is, a request for information. Rather, it is a routinized request for a routinized response. Cultural norms of communicative behavior also involve presuppositions.

Words can also be used to convey symbolic meanings expressing cultural values and shared assumptions. For example, when President Bush declared a political action, "A War against terrorism," he attempted to describe a group of people as "terrorists", expressing a strong, negative judgment against them. The power of language is not only that values attached to words reveal attitudes of the speaker, but also that words create compatible attitudes in perceivers. Cultural symbols are transmitted through language and obtain their strength because speakers/listeners and producers/perceivers unconsciously accept their indirectly expressed assumptions. The

power of language to convey social messages is recognized, for instance, by many American women who object to being called "girl" or African-American men who object to being called "boy."

As difficult as it is to translate the full range of meanings expressed by speakers in another culture, it is an even more complex task to translate the meaning conveyed by the structure and use of discourse from one language/culture to another. Discourse practices are taken for granted and become part of a speaker's production and interpretation of speech without their conscious reflection on the presupposed meanings of particular choices. These practices become "naturalized" in a specific cultural community, while the others think them rather as culturally produced and ideologically evaluated (Hymes, 65; Canale and Swain, 1-47; Kovalik, "Language Learning Simulations: A Piagetian Perspective" 345-352).

III. Global cognitive system

How could we overcome this intercultural miscommunication in the era of globalization? How could we effectively teach our EFL students who are able to easily pick up English as best as they can?

In order to solve this problem, I accept the term ethno scientific approach to the system of classification that people construct to organize knowledge of their universe. The term 'ethno-science' is derived from the Greek word ethnos, meaning "people" or "a division of people." Such systems are based on taxonomic hierarchies in which some entities are ordered hierarchically and other entities are contrasted taxonomically. Studies of ethno scientific domains in different cultures demonstrate the variety of underlying assumptions that can be used to group entities (Bonvillain, 56).

In addition to this ethno-science understanding of group entities, I would also like to emphasize the universal cognitive and linguistic processes in the era of globalization. In order to prove the universal cognitive and linguistic processes in the era of globalization, I will assume that cultural models have been historically and traditionally providing frameworks for understanding the physical and social world we live in. Therefore, cognitive anthropologists explain that the representative universal cognitions among human being are color terms, concepts of space and location, metaphor of kinship, and the metaphor of the body. And most of physical and social world we live in are categorized by the focal meaning and prototypes. A word's focal meaning refers to the "best example" or "most typical example" of possible meaning that it encompasses. Focal meanings of words and prototypes of categories demonstrate the ways that people make sense of the multitude of objects and events in their world (Bonvillain, 58).

Globalization accelerates the profundity of metaphor with which we are surrounded and communicate. Cultural meanings are additionally expressed through complex

processes of semantic extension and transfer. One such process is that of metaphor. Metaphors are based on unstated comparisons between entities or events that share certain features. The comparisons implicitly highlight similarities while ignoring contrasts. According to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and Johnson, 57). Analysis of recurring metaphors in a language reveals underlying concepts that help construct the reality or world view of speakers. In a statement consistent with writings of Sapir and Whorf (Sapir, 98; Whorf, 56; Kaa, 85-96), Lakoff and Johnson explain that "cultural assumptions, values and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay that we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural⋯we experience our "world" in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself" (Lakoff and Johnson, 57). They also argue that analyses of metaphor provide insights into cultural constructions of reality because "our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical innature" (Lakoff and Johnson, 3).

An example from their work that illustrates a frequent construct in English is also the global pervasive theme "Time is money". This concept is embedded in these statements:

You don't use your time profitably.
How do you spend your time these days?
This gadget will save you hours. (Lakoff and Johnson, 7-9)

These expressions are based on metaphors that treat intangible entities or qualities as though they were concrete objects. In our conceptual model, we conceive of "time" as a particular kind of object or commodity. "Time in our culture is a valuable commodity. It is a limited resource that we use to accomplish our goals⋯ Thus we understand and experience time as the kind of thing that can be spent, wasted, budgeted, invested wisely or poorly, saved or squandered" (Lakoff and Johnson, 8).

Another recurring metaphorical construct discussed by Lakoff and Johnson is the special cognition between "up" and "down." Activities or states viewed positively are expressed as "up"; those evaluated negatively are expressed as "down(15-17). The following list presents some of these comparisons:

	Up	Down
Emotions	You're in high spirits	He's feeling low today.
Consciousness	Wake up!	She sank into a coma.
Health	He's in top shape.	Her health is declining.
Control:	I'm on top of the situation.	He fell from power.
Status:	She'll rise to the top.	He's at the bottom of society.
Virtuousness:	He's high-minded.	I wouldn't stoop to that.

(Lakoff and Johnson, 15–17)

Another type of metaphoric construction common in English is the use of container images when imaginary depicting physical entities or processes. This pattern is consistent with tendencies in English to make objects out of intangibles. Once a non-concrete entity is transformed into an object, it can be contained, entered, left, held, or the like. Use of locative prepositions (prepositions that denote location, direction, or movement in regard to an object) often signals this type of metaphor:

> He's out of his mind.
> They're in love.
> I feel under the weather.

In these expressions, subjects are depicted "as if" they were in some physical relation to a defined and contained space, for example, to be in love. Here, "love," an internal emotion, is transformed into a tangible object and then treated as if it were an objectified and tangible place on the model of actual physical space, such as "they're in the house."

Every language has characteristic conceptual metaphors that structure not only the language itself, but also particular views of reality that speakers share and unconsciously assume. A special type of metaphor occurring in many languages is personification—the cognitive process of attributing animate or human qualities to nonliving entities or events. Here are some examples from English:

> High prices are eating up my paycheck.
> Anxiety is killing him.
> The window looks out over the mountains.

These sentences are semantically inconsistent or anomalous in a literal sense, but they are transformed into culturally acceptable expressions through metaphor. In the last sentence, an inanimate object, window, is interpreted "as if" it were capable of an action, looking, which is inherently possible only for animate beings. In concrete animate beings and therefore able to eat or kill.

IV. Narrative discourse in the storytelling

Narratives are stories or framed segments of ongoing discourse that relate or report events in chronological sequence. There are many kinds of narratives: historical narratives that recount events in the history of a community or a people; mythic narratives that recount happenings in primordial themes or in a realm other than our own; and personal narratives that relate events in the speaker's life (or in the lives of persons whom the speaker is describing). For our purposes, we will be analyzing the third category, that is, personal narratives.

One of the foremost researchers in the field of narrative analysis, William Labov, noted that "narratives are privileged forms of discourse that play central interactions, people talk about their experiences, past events that have meaning in their lives. Although storytelling may not be the focus of all conversations, narratives are frequently included to exemplify or dramatize a person's feelings, thoughts and opinions. Labov defined a personal narrative as "a report of a sequence of events that have entered into the biography of the speaker by a sequence of clauses that correspond to the order of the original event"(Labov, 398). This definition captures several important features. Narratives are told in chronological order, with beginnings, middles, and ends that follow the sequence of the experienced events.

In addition, a personal narrative recounts events that are meaningful to the speaker's life and that are "emotionally and socially evaluated and so transformed from raw experience" (Labov, 199). A narrative is not an exhaustive recounting of every element of the reported experiences but is the outcome of the narrator's editing. Speakers select certain events, highlight some features and episodes. And trim or eliminate others to make a story that is coherent, dramatic, and convincing.

Personal narratives must be "reportable," Since narratives tend to occupy more conversational space(i.e., they are longer) than other contributions, the narrative must be of interest to the audience; it must be reportable. Narratives must also have a point. Speakers may assert causality, praise, or blame, or comment on the competence or incompetence of people in the story. Narratives must also be credible; that is, a narrator asserts that the events recounted have actually taken place. Credibility, thus, distinguishes personal narratives from jokes, tall tales, or fantasies.

A fundamental issue in narrative analysis is the attempt to understand "how experience is translated from the narrator to the audience" (Labov, 411). Personal narratives relate events seen exclusively through the eyes of the narrator. The chronological sequencing of events contributes to the transfer of experienceas the audience becomes aware of the events "as if" they were participants. Finally, successful narratives describe experience in objective terms, avoiding the subjectivity of the narrator's emotions. According to Labov, "those narratives that have the greatest impact on audiences—that seize the attention of listeners and allow them to share the

experience of the narrator---are those that use the most objective means of expression" (Labov, 412). Events narrated objectively are taken as more credible than events narrated subjectively or through the emotional filter of the speaker.

The idea of narrative, that is, the construed narrative is amended in two ways: First, the narrative of a perceiver is not necessarily an entity which is related or separated from that of producer. Thus, a producer can create a narrative without any separate sentient entity to perceive it. But that producer will function as perceiver as well, even if only in the course of production. Second, an intentional sentient producer is not strictly necessary for the construal of something as a narrative. A perceiving mind by itself is capable of experiencing some naturally occurring formation or some unintended formation by a sentient entity, as being a narrative work, a "story."

I will show an example of teaching cultural contents such as video clips in the EFL classroom. The Alice in Wonderland is a good example of how to approach to children's emotion and cognition as well as their language acquisition. In 1865 Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* has fascinated people interested in language.[1] The world of Wonderland, as typified by such odd characters as the Cheshire Cat and such odd situations as the Mad Hatter's tea party, seems strange, childlike, and unfamiliar to adult logic. But the real strangeness arises from the use of language in Wonderland. Alice's adventures are, in fact, linguistic misadventures. Not taking the linguistic system for granted, Alice offers vivid examples of the breaking down of language as a system of communication.

V. *Alice in Wonderland*

Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865) is a novel written by Charles Lutwidge Dodgson under the pseudonym. Alice in Wonderland, a popularized title by the numerous stage, film and television adaptations of the story produced over the years. It tells the story of a girl named Alice who falls down a into a fantasy world populated by peculiar and creatures.

Alice is bored of sitting on the riverbank with her sister, who is reading a book. Suddenly she sees a white rabbit, wearing a coat and carrying a watch, run past, lamenting running late. She follows it down a rabbit hole and falls very slowly down a tunnel lined with curious objects. She lands in a long hallway lined with locked doors. She finds a little key sitting on a glass table. Behind a curtain on the wall she finds a tiny door that opens with the key and leads into a beautiful garden. The door however is too small for Alice to fit through. Looking back at the table she sees a bottle labeled

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1) Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.* (New York: New American Library, 1960). First published in 1865. I will write the page number whenever I cite this Alice textbook with parentheses.

"DRINK ME" that was not there before. She drinks and it causes her to shrink to a size small enough to fit through the door. Unfortunately Alice has left the key high above on the table. She finds a box under the table in which there is a cake with the words "EAT ME" on it. She eats it, thinking that if it makes her smaller she can creep under the door and if it makes her larger she can get the key.

The cake makes Alice grow so tall that her head hits the ceiling. Getting frustrated and not to mention confused, she cries. Her tears flood the hallway. The White Rabbit runs by and is so frightened by Alice that he drops the gloves and fan he is holding. She fans herself with the fan and starts to wonder if she is still the same person that she was before. The fan causes her to shrink again. Alice swims through her own tears and meets a mouse, who is swimming as well. She tries to make small talk with him but all she can think of talking about is her cat, which offends the mouse. The pool becomes crowded with other animals and birds that have been swept away. They all swim to shore.

The first question is how to get dry again. The mouse gives them a very dry lecture on William the Conqueror. A dodo decides that the best thing to dry them off would be a Caucus-Race. The Dodo marks out a race course in a sort of circle and the racers begin running whenever they feel like it, and everyone wins. Alice reaches into her pocket and finds a box of which she distributes among the winners. The animals then beg the mouse to tell them something more and he recites a tale about a mouse and a dog. Alice mistakes his tale for his tail. This insults him and he leaves. She starts talking about her catagain, which frightens the rest of the animals away.

The White Rabbit appears again and orders Alice to go back to his house and fetch him his gloves and fan. Inside, she finds another bottle and drinks from it. Drinking makes Alice grow so large that she has to stick one arm out the window and her foot up the chimney. The horrified Rabbit orders his gardener, a lizard named Bill, to climb on the roof and go down the chimney. As Bill slides down the chimney Alice kicks him out with her foot, shooting him up into the sky. Outside, Alice hears the voices of animals that have gathered to gawk at her giant arm. The crowd hurls pebbles at her, which turn into little cakes that shrink Alice down again. Eating makes Alice shrink down. She runs into the woods, where she decides that she must get back to her right size and she must find the lovely garden. Suddenly Alice is confronted by a giant puppy. She picks up a stick and teases him with it until he is tired and she can run away. She comes upon a mushroom and sitting on it is a smoking a caterpillar smoking a hookah.

The Caterpillar questions Alice and she admits to her current identity crisis. He asks her to recite "You Are Old, Father William." She does so, but it comes out with many errors. She insults him by saying that three inches is a wretched height to be (he himself is three inches tall). The Caterpillar crawls away into the grass, telling Alice that one side of the mushroom will make her taller and the other side will make her

shorter. She breaks off two pieces from the mushroom. One side makes her shrink smaller than ever, while another causes her neck to grow high into the trees, where a pigeon mistakes her for a serpent. With some effort, Alice brings herself back to her usual height. She stumbles upon a small estate and uses the mushroom to reach a more appropriate height.

A Fish-Footman has an invitation for the Duchess of the house, which he delivers to a Frog-Footman. Alice observes this transaction and, after a perplexing conversation with the frog, welcomes herself into the house. The Duchess' Cook is throwing dishes and making a soup which has too much pepper, which causes Alice, the Duchess and her baby (but not the cook or her grinning) to sneeze violently. The Duchess tosses her baby up and down while reciting the poem" Speak roughly toy our little boy." The Duchess gives Alice the baby while she leaves to go play with the Queen. To Alice's surprise, the baby later turns into a pig, so she sets it free in the woods. The Cheshire Cat appears in a tree, directing her to the March Hare's house. He disappears but his grin remains behind to float on it sown in the air prompting Alice to remark that she has often seen a cat without a grin but never a grin without a cat.

Alice becomes a guest at a mad tea party, along with the Hatter (now more commonly known as the Mad Hatter), the March Hare, and the Dormouse. In the course of the party, Alice reveals that the date is May 4 (which happens to be the birthday of her presumed real-life counterpart, Alice Pleasance Liddell). The other characters give Alice many riddles and stories, until she becomes so insulted that she leaves, claiming that it was the stupidest tea party that she had ever been to. Alice comes upon a door in a tree, and enters it, and finds herself back in the long hallway from the first chapter. She opens the door, eats part of her mushroom, and shrinks so she can get into the beautiful garden.

Now in the beautiful garden, she comes upon three living playing cards painting the white roses on a rose tree red because the Queen of Hearts hates white roses. A procession of more cards, kings and queens and even the White Rabbit enters the garden. Alice meets the violent Queen and pacifying King of Hearts. The Queen orders "Off with their heads!" when she sees the work of the gardeners. A game of croquet begins, with flamingos as the mallets and hedgehogs as the balls. The Queen condemns more people to death, and Alice once again meets the Cheshire Cat. The Queen of Hearts then debates chopping off the Cat's head, even though that is all there is of him. Alice suggests talking to the Duchess, so the Queen orders the Duchess out of prison.

The Duchess is brought to the croquet ground. She is now less angry and is always trying to find morals in things. The Queen of Hearts dismisses her on the threat of execution and introduces Alice to the , who takes her to the. The Mock Turtle is very sad, even though he has no sorrow. He tries to tell his story about how he used to be a real turtle in school, which The Gryphon interrupts so they can play a game. The

Mock Turtle and the Gryphon dance to the Lobster Quadrille, while Alice recites(rather in correctly) "Tis the Voice of the Lobster." The Mock Turtle sings them" Beautiful Soup" during which the Gryphon drags Alice away for an impending trial.

At the trial, the Knave of Hearts is accused of stealing the tarts. The jury box is made up of twelve animals, including Bill the Lizard. The judge is the King of Hearts. The first witness is the Mad Hatter, who doesn't help the case at all, followed by the Duchess' Cook. During the proceedings, Alice finds that she is steadily growing larger when she is suddenly called as a witness herself.

Alice accidentally knocks over the jury box as she stands in alarm. She argues with the King and Queen of Hearts over the ridiculous proceedings, eventually refusing to hold her tongue. The Queen shouts her familiar "Off with her head!" but Alice is unafraid, calling them out as just a pack of cards. Alice's sister wakes her up for tea, brushing what turns out to be some leaves and not a shower of playing cards from Alice's face. Alice leaves her sister on the bank to imagine all the curious happenings for herself.

Alice faces numerous wondrous and wonderful things in wonderland. While watching these wondrous happenings that occurred to Alice, Korean children who are not good at English finds the similar atmosphere of miscommunication with those of Alice's in addition to the wondrous moving back and forth. In Wonderland Alice has enormous difficulties understanding the creatures she meets, and they have just as much difficulty understanding her, because words seem to slip and slide into each other. For example, the Mouse begins to tell her "a long and a sad tale" (Carroll 1960: 35), but she hears "a long tail" and wonders why and how a tail can be sad. Further, when the Mouse contradicts something she has said by exclaiming," I had not," Alice, thinking he has a "knot" in his tail, offers to undo it. Her gracious offer, however, actually offends the Mouse, who walks away saying," You insult me by talking such nonsense!"(36). Her conversation with the mysterious Cheshire Cat also results in misunderstanding. The Cat first vanishes but then returns to ask Alice if she meant "fig" or "pig" when describing the transformation of the Duchess's child(64). Here the Cheshire Cat draws attention to a problem with words that compounds the earlier one." Tail" and "tale" sound alike but are spelled differently. "Fig" and "pig," on the other hand, almost sound the same, just as they are almost spelled the same; what distinguishes one sound and spelling from the other is the initial consonant.

Similar words like "tail" and "tale," "not" and "knot," and even "fig" and "pig," mean something only so long as the form of one word can be distinguished from that of the other. The phonetic slippages which occur in these examples blur that difference to result in Alice's misunderstanding. Such slippage is not limited only to a word's phonetic form, since in Wonder‑land a word's meaning can even be transformed into its own negation. At Alice's trial before the Queen of Hearts, the King asks her what she knows. "Nothing," Alice replies, and the King instructs the jury, "That's very

important." The White Rabbit, however, interrupts: "Unimportant, your Majesty means, of course." The King reverses his previous statement but is now unable to distinguish one word from the other:' "Unimportant, of course, I meant,' the King hastily said, and went onto himself in an undertone, 'important-unimportant-important-unimportant -important-' as if he were trying which word sounded best"(109). Not surprisingly, the jury is now very confused; some write down" important, "some" un‑important." But no one seems more confused than the King himself. After reversing his original statement, he can no longer distinguish one word from the other; the meaning of either word depends upon an opposition between them which has disappeared. The presence of the negative prefix "un-" in one word and its absence in the other indicates this opposition, as the White Rabbit indirectly points out when he accents the prefix. In refusing to recognize the significance of that prefix-in making its importance unimportant, so to speak-the King collapses the crucial difference between the two words which allows them each to mean. And, once that happens, "impor‑tant" ceases to exist as a concept of value for the King because it has been erased from his language. These instances of misunderstanding all exemplify how an isolated word gains or loses meaning.

Alice's misadventures with language also show how a word's meaning depends upon its placement in a sequence alongside other words. Slowly tumbling down the rabbit hole, she asks herself, "Do cats eat bats?" and "Do bats eat cats?" (19). For all the similarity of these questions, each asks something different. Depending upon the syntactic placement of the word "cats" or "bats" as the subject and not the object of her question, Alice could be asking about the eating habits of cats or about those of bats. Her confusion occurs because she cannot recognize this difference; since she "couldn't answer either question, it didn't matter much which way she put it" (19). The order does matter, of course, if she wants an answer.

The blurring of syntactic difference in Alice's question ex‑poses as well the arbitrary relation between words and mean‑ings. "Cat" and "bat" each refer to different types of animals. It makes all the difference in the world to the Mouse, for instance, that Alice is speaking of her cat, an animal he hates, and not her bat. All the same, even though cats and bats do not at all look alike, the words designating them resemble each other in sound and spelling to the point that Alice can exchange one for the other in her question.

The arbitrary attachment of words and referents becomes even more of an issue when the Cheshire Cat explains to Alice why he's mad:

> "To begin with," said the Cat, "a dog's not mad. You grant that?"
> "I suppose so," said Alice.
> "Well, then," the Cat went on, "you see a dog growls when it's angry, and wags its
> tail when it's pleased. Now I growl when I'm pleased, and wag my tail when I'm
> angry. Therefore I'm mad."
> "I call it purring, not growling," said Alice. "Call it what you like," said the Cat.

This conversation between Alice and the Cat makes the relation between a word and its referent very problematic. What the Cat hears as "growling" is what Alice thinks of as "purring." "Call it what you like," the Cat responds. Although, as far as the Cat is concerned, the relation between a word and its referent is simply an arbitrary one, it does not necessarily follow that the word used is irrelevant. "Growling" and "purring" may refer to the same phenomenon— the same noise made by a cat—yet each word determines a different meaning for the noise. Calling it "purring" makes it appear as "normal" behavior for the animal, whereas calling it "growling" makes it appear as "mad" behavior.

In either case, to make sense of the noise, Alice and the Cat use a word that places it in a comparative framework. The Cat's word "growling" establishes a similarity between dogs and cats in order to point out the difference: if "growling" describes what a dog and the Cheshire Cat both do, then what is "normal" behavior for one animal is a sign of "madness" in the other. Alice's word "purring," on the other hand, places the noise in another kind of comparative framework, that of a dog's and cat's emotional states. "Purring," a word associated with cats, establishes the difference between the two animals in order to point out an underlying similarity: a dog wags its tail when happy and a cat purrs, just as a dog growls when angry and a cat switches its tail.

If not placed in such a comparative framework, a structure made possible by language, then the noise to which Alice and the Cat are both referring would simply remain a meaningless phenomenon, something indefinite because inarticulated. The Cat says, "Call it what you like," as if all possible words for this noise were the same, even a matter of personal choice. Yet call what you like? Without a word, what does "it" refer to in the Cat's sentence? Language enablesus, no less than it does Alice and the Cat, to distinguish the meaning of one sound from that of another. It is language which provides the structural framework that enables the noise to be conceived and thus perceived not as noise but as a distinct sound, growling or purring, and a meaningful sound at that, a sign of the Cat's madness or normality.

In still another instance of misunderstanding, Alice and the Mad Hatter talk to each other about time, but they each use the word "time" to refer to something different.

> Alice sighed wearily. "I think you might do something better with the time," she
> said, "than wasting it in asking riddles that have no answers."
> "If you knew Time as well as I do." said the Hatter, "you wouldn't talk about
> wasting it.It'shim."
> "I don't know what you mean," said Alice.
> "Of course you don't!" the Hatter said, tossing his head contemptuously. "I dare say
> you never even spoke to Time!"
> "Perhaps not," Alice cautiously replied; "but I know I have to beat time when I

learn music."

"Ah! That accounts for it," said the Hatter. "He won't stand beating. Now, if you only kept on good terms with him, he'd do almost anything you liked with the clock." (69)

Because Alice and the Hatter each take literally a different figurative expression of time, neither understands what the other one means. To Alice time is a concept, so she uses the pronoun "it," whereas to the Hatter time is a person; he not only uses a different pronoun — the personal "he" — but also shows how that pronoun creates an entirely different conception of time.

Wonderland as a whole appears strange to Alice because the users of language there challenge the logic of common sense, which assumes that cats purr and that time is not a person. Alice thinks that sense is "common" because it transcends language; but, as both the Hatter and the Cheshire Cat demonstrate, sense is inseparable from language. What Alice calls the Cat's behavior determines its meaning and, moreover, assigns it a normative value. Likewise, her concept of time is not described by language but produced by it. For all her mastery of familiar linguistic patterns, the slipperiness of words like "tail" and "tale," "fig" and "pig," "important" and "unimportant," "cat" and "bat," "growl" and "purr" illustrate various ways in which words mean something only in relation to each other.

As Alice's adventures demonstrate, while English may appear to be the same language to all its users, in practice just the opposite is true. Different English-speaking cultures us the language differently, as we have already indicated, so there are, in fact, many English languages, each regulated by different version of the system and each further modified because of its interaction with other, non-verbal, cultural sign systems.

Moreover, in any given culture and historical time, individual speakers and writers of anyone English language produce many different types of discourse. Spoken discourse, for example, varies according to the social situation: whether addressing friends, parents, teachers, strangers, clerks. Likewise writing a letter, or a report, or a job application, or a civil service exam, or a literature paper depends upon one's ability as a use of English to produce a variety of discourses. In addition writing can often turn out to be discursively plural or heterogenic, even within the same piece of prose: when combining description, for instance, with exposition, or 'with argumen‐tation. Each of these modes of writing comprises a different type of discourse, and combinations result in an even greater variety. Legal, medical, scientific, scholarly, business, technological, bureaucratic, and literary writing also use English differently, in that they follow different conventions of organization, style, documentation, vocabulary, and so constitute different dis‐courses too. Using English, then, requires one's participation in a communal sign system which is historically specific, culturally located, and discursively varied. A sign system enables the production of meaning, but, in practice, discourse is where meanings actually get

produced.

Although discourse is in no way limited to writing, writing typifies how discourse presents us with a situation calling for interpretation, for stabilizing the play of signification. Unlike speech, writing foregrounds the consti‑tution of discourse as a chain of references, not from sign to meaning, but from sign to sign. Narrative cannot be con‑sidered apart from language. The term "narrative" applies to the visual medium of storytelling as well. In a film, for instance, the camera recounts -- because it records - events no less than a novel does. In both cases, the story is mediated by its telling - its medium of communication -- so that the two are inseparable (Chatman, 59). The post-Saussurean theory of language as system and discourse, as structure and play, there‑fore demands a revision of traditional notions about narrative. This theory calls for rigorous attention to narrative as a set of signs. It requires a method of textual analysis responsive to both the structuring operation of a sign system and the instability of signs in discourse (Blonsky, 112).

Since the theory of language reconceives the relation between language and meaning, it demands, as well, a reconsideration of the traditional practices of reading language critically. Traditional literary criticism pays close attention to language, to be sure, but it justifies this attention by treating literature as a special use of language which requires readers to have what Jonathan Culler has called, in an analogy to linguistic competence, literary competence:" a set of conventions for reading texts [as literature]" (Culler, 118). As with all uses of language, literary competence is not intuitive but learned. To be a competent reader of literary discourse, one must acquire knowledge of formal conventions, such as tropes and meter, so as to recognize the literary features of, say, a poem. More importantly, one must also acquire knowledge of the conventions that can be used to analyze and interpret these features.

According to Culler, three basic conventions of analysis inform traditional literary competence. These are: (I) the con‑vention of significance, that a work of literature is "expressing a significant attitude to some problem concerning man and/or his relation to the universe"; (2) the convention of metaphorical coherence, that the work's figural devices (such as metaphor itself, but also alliteration, rhyme, and so forth) produce coherence on the levels of both signifier and signified; (3) the convention of thematic unity, that the linguistic features of the work, identified through the method of analysis laid out by the second convention, provide it with a unifying formal structure that reinforces the determinate meaning expected because of the first convention (Culler, 115).

The conventions of literary competence reproduce a fundamental and often unquestioned assumption motivating traditional understanding of literature: those essential linguistic qualities distinguish literary from non-literary discourse, and that from these features discerning readers, trained in literature, can recover a timeless meaning placed in a work by its author. Being a set of conventions for reading, literary competence is a social (and socializing) practice, reproduced through various institutions

(e.g. school, the media, book publishing and re‑viewing, sponsorship of the arts, and so forth) which teach or, more implicitly, reproduce conventions of reading and which certify the identity and value of some works as literature. What constitutes a reader's literary competence is thus subject to change, since, at different historical moments and in different cultures, what people read and value, and how they do so, differs.

As Eagleton insists metaphor and metonymy are much more than figures of speech which merely dress up meanings (Eagleton, 93–94). Rather, they are fundamental to alluses of language because they are the means by which we conceptualize relations between signifiers and signifieds according to a perceived comparability, in the case of metaphor, or according to a perceived contiguity, in the case of metonymy. Put thus abstractly, these terms may seem like paradigm and syntagm. A text is paradigmatically constructed out of substitutions and selections -- it works rather like metaphor. And a text is syntagmatically constructed out of combinations and additions -- it works rather like metonymy. The sets metaphor and metonymy, and paradigm and syntagm, are not identical, however. They provide language with two pairs of coincidental axes: metaphor forming an axis of comparability and metonymy forming an axis of continuity; paradigm forming an axis of substitution and syntagm forming an axis of combination (Saussure, 66–67; cf. Young, 89–92.).

The language of any text, verbal or non-verbal, can be analyzed according to relations of similarity (paradigm and metaphor) and placement (syntagm and metonymy). What we have been explaining therefore bears directly upon the particular concern of this book, which is narrative. Using the principles of metaphoric comparability and metonymic contiguity, Christian Metz has identified four basic types of textual linkings in cinematic narrative (Metz, 189–90). Each type consists, of signifiers which are not restricted to words in dialogue, since film uses visual as well as verbal signs.We can explain Metz's four types of signifying configurations very easily with our own examples, all drawn from a single film *Alice in Wonderland*.

VI. Children Studies on spatial concepts in Wonderland

Studies in children's acquisition of spatial concepts indicate that the way their language structures space and location influences their perceptual processes. As Melissa Bowerman notes, some form of spatial understanding predates mastering linguistic skills, but specific linguistic input has a very early (as early as 18 months) impact on children's perception (Bowerman, 386).

Therefore, although spatial knowledge is necessary to all humans, dividing space into categories and manipulating their meanings and relationships is learned linguistic behavior. Children build on basic prelinguistic knowledge as they acquire the words and syntactic patterns that their language requires to talk about spatial concepts. In

morphologically analytic languages like English, separate words, often in the form of prepositions or postpositions, are used to describe relationships between object or between an object and its ground while in morphologically complex languages, nominal or verbal morphemes are used to express these relationships. Cross-linguistic research suggests that children acquire the means of expressing these notions in roughly the same order. First learned are concepts of containment or support, proximity, separation, surrounding, and order (Bowerman, 388). In English, such concepts are expressed through prepositions such as "in"(containment), "on"(support and contiguity), "under"(occlusion), "next to", "beside", "between"(proximity), "in front of", "behind"(projective order). Of course, different languages may have words with similar translations in their lexicon, but these words may have ranges of meaning that do not translate exactly from one language to another. For instance, note the different concepts that the English word "in" expresses (Levinson, 187).

There is a special pattern through which Alice treks through Wonderland. Her journey begins at the riverbank, she falls down the rabbit hole into a long narrow hall, and from there she enters an open pool. This open outside to closed inside pattern is a constant through Wonderland. Also, she is constantly separated from spatial objects by her size. In the hall, it is impossible for Alice to reach the garden because of her size. For a rational person, with an unstable body, transferring from the hall to the garden would be easy. However, Alice takes things as they come at this point in time and simply says enough well to the fact that she was the wrong size for the door, (as any child would). Her size control system at this point in time is bottle (liquid, wet) shrink vs. cake (dry) grow.

The rabbit's fan also turns out to be a shrinking operator. At this point in time Alice also looses linguistic control and begins speaking homophonic nonsense to insult the mouse, with the confusion of tale/tail and knot/not. The pool and the rabbit's house are spatially connected, with the help of Alice running off. Here the growing system reverses: bottle (liquid) grow vs. cake (dry) shrink. Even in Wonderland Alice's size control appears to be unique. This is seen when Alice grows too large for the rabbit's house and her arm startles both the white rabbit and the lizard Bill. An arm you goose! Who has ever seen one that size?, says the white rabbit. If size control were an everyday event in wonderland, Alice's connection with the real world obviously still remains, as seen when she confuses growing large with growing old. While stuck in the rabbit's house she says to herself there's no room for me to grow up anymore here referring to her size in comparison to the house.

Shall I never get any older than I am now? That'll be a comfort, one way—never to be an old woman. Throughout her journey, each time she enters a house she sees and experiences something unpleasant. From the house to the wood, there is a second motory transition, Alice running off. Here she meets the caterpillar. He is sitting on a mushroom and smoking out of a hookah. Whether or not these two objects were placed

purposely to represent the use of mind-expanding substances shall forever be left unknown. However, the idea of such subliminal messages should not be ruled out. Alice here finds it almost impossible to answer simple questions such as who are you? and why? Here the caterpillar introduces a new growth system to Alice: right hand mushroom-shrink vs. left hand mushroom-grow. From now on Alice uses her growth system a bit more wisely and has wise rebuttals towards characters she comes across. She is slowly growing familiar with the ways of Wonderland. The second house she comes upon belongs to the Dutchess. Once again the house is a horrible place for Alice to visit. The Dutchess is a mean tempered woman. She is also considered by many as the most radical pole of madness. She is first aggressive towards Alice and then more conciliatory as their conversation proceeds. The deformed pig baby, which Alice holds, is another taste of the horror seen when Alice enters a house. Perhaps the violence of this scene (the Dutchess throwing pots and pans) sends the white rabbit now to the queen instead of the Dutchess: a significant switch between female characters. From this point on Alice will not enter anymore houses, they are too violent. Once again Alice walks off through the wood and to the final house, the Mad Hatter's. Here they sit outside and she once again becomes frustrated by her company's lack of sense. Alice walks through the wood, finds a tree with a door in it, and stands once again in a hall. Now, a more intelligent Alice, takes the key, nibbles the mushroom, and enters into the garden. She has now figured out how to use Wonderland's resources for her own benefit, (the second obvious step in the growth metaphor). Finally Alice enters the long desired garden. However she finds this place to be anything but an area of refuge.

The characters: an upset gryphon, a melodramatic Mock Turtle, a lesbian Dutchess and a murderous queen, and a ridiculous king. Here we see strange transformations of words, which do not apply to their general rule, but to their particular use in sentence. This is called legisign. An example of legisign is when the king of hearts fails to distinguish between the antonyms important and unimportant? that's very important, the king said, turning to the jury, when the white rabbit interrupted: unimportant, your majesty means of course, he said. unimportant, of course, I meant, the king hastily said, and went on to himself in an undertone, important-unimportant-important as if her were trying which word sounded best. In Wonderland, the phrase goes what I mean, not what I say really comes into play. At first the king is only confused as to which word to use. He eventually forgets totally the linguistic rules that distinguish both words as antonyms. Finally he concerns himself only with how the word sounds in the sentence. Alice now enters her final growth stage seen in Wonderland. During the trial, Alice becomes so furious that she accomplishes self-metamorphoses without the use of any outside substances. She grows until the deck of cards becomes, nothing but, and runs once again runs to the open outside, out of her say dream, and back to the riverbank. Humans in general tend to find interest in literature that they themselves posses some sort of relation towards. Alice in Wonderland pertains to all people; it signifies growth.

The patterns seen throughout this story had obviously been carefully placed and thought out. Anyone that ties these patterns solely to coincidence should re-read Lewis's text. Lewis Carroll had a message to get across and many believe that it lies within Alice's Wonderland.

Of the many celebrated scenes in the Alice narratives, the most memorable, most potent, most quoted is Alice's initial descent to the bottom of the rabbit-hole. The lastingness of this scene seems even greater when we realize that, although neither Carroll in Alice's Adventures Underground nor Tenniel in the first edition of Wonderland illustrated the moment with a picture, it still became (along with the Mad Hatter's tea party) one of the signature images of the Alice stories. Why, we must ask, did the Victorians retain, with a powerful tenacity, this vision of a little girl moving through a tight space toward the hidden world of Wonderland?

The answer to this question is not--at least not wholly--that the scene simply represents a child's metaphorical progress through the birth canal (1) and that this, in turn, symbolizes some kind of rite of passage, a movement towards some deeper knowledge. For then how do we explain Alice's conspicuous lack of internal development in both stories? Indeed, for a narrative that thematizes motion, Alice's psychical growth remains disturbingly static. Throughout both narratives, Alice displays little emotional variation, for when she is not frustrated or anxious, she is, for the most part, vapid or expressionless. In fact, one is immediately struck by her coolness and indifference as she drops through the rabbit-hole. (2) Thus, because scene changes in Wonderland and Looking-Glass rarely betoken any emotional or intellectual modulations, Alice's falling into Wonderland signals no internal transition.

But the image does relocate her body and within this fictive world, location is everything. The scene gestures Alice's departure, her separation, her movement towards an autonomy of which every child dreams when, in play, retreating to a hidden space. A child's impulse to hide, to create a secret space, is one of the most compelling of all human wishes, the wish for autonomy and autarchy--"to be cut off from the word and yet owner of the world." (3) The fantasy of autonomy sets children dreaming of far-away worlds and hidden gardens. The image, then, of Alice's fall begins to fulfill this powerful wish for autonomy, which culminates, finally, in Alice's self-coronation at the end of Looking-Glass. Yet it is only within the child's willing imagination that a secret space can encroach so closely upon autonomy, for as we shall see, secrecy and autonomy are irreconcilable not only in the demanding world of realism, but even in the more elastic world of Carrollian fantasy.

Alice's descent into Wonderland and her entrance into the Looking-Glass kingdom would seem like ripe metaphors for Carroll to explore the thoughts and fantasies of Alice's psyche. What could be more oneiric than an underground world or a secret realm beyond a mirror? Further, the construction of the dream frame in nineteenth- and [End Page 2] twentieth-century literature usually signals an author's undertaking of

psychological realism. Much has been written on the Freudian thematics of the Alice stories, (4) but if, as many have argued, Alice falls down into the dreamland of her own unconscious, she meets there not identification and revelation, but rather frustration and deferral. Recall that in both works Alice awakens not as from a wish fulfilled, but as from a desire thwarted. If Wonderland really represents the underground of her own psyche, it is a psyche not entirely her own, more different than mysterious, more foreign than obscure. This becomes most apparent when we realize that the emotional and cognitive dissonance between Alice and her dream creatures reflects a larger disunion of energies that marks the narratives. Throughout both stories Carroll works hard to illustrate the incongruousness of sensibilities that estranges Alice from the other figures. The scene in Looking-Glass in which the Queen offers Alice a dry biscuit, unfittingly, to quell her thirst is a paradigm of the sharp discordance between characters. Inappropriate and irrelevant responses such as the Queen's fill both Alice stories and reveal an atmosphere depleted of psychical recognition and sympathetic reaction. To read a text as an exposition of a subject's inner world is to assume that it is through the lens of that subject's psyche that we identify symbols and organize meaning. However, the psychological dissociation between Alice and the Wonderland and Looking-Glass figures disallows this genre of interpretation.

The dream frame does open up the possibility for psychological realism, but Carroll closes it off just as quickly. One way of apprehending this is by comparing Wonderland with The Wizard of Oz--a narrative similar in structure and content. Both are stories of a young girl's dream of a passage through, and return from, a kind of fairy-tale land. But the dream frame in Baum's text shapes itself into a psychoanalytic examination of Dorothy's psyche. The parallels between the waking world and the dream world inform one another, and we begin to see how Dorothy's unconscious translates her lived experience into the metaphors of dream work. In Carroll's text, however, the connection between Alice's waking reality and her dream scape is radically tenuous; the two worlds are almost autonomous. How can we say that Alice's dream is an exposition of her unconscious when Carroll paints her and her world in only the broadest strokes? Further, Alice's desire to reach the garden never equals the pitch and urgency of Dorothy's longing to return to Kansas. In the simplest terms, Alice lacks the passion and commitment to her own destiny that advances Dorothy's journey through Oz (Barthes, *The Eiffel Tower* 17).[2] As Alice encounters the creatures of Wonderland and the Looking-Glass world, Carroll creates not a quest for identity, or a solitary journey into the self, but rather a sequence of spectacles for childhood voyeurism.

The inhabitants of her dream world are hollow signifiers that repel interpretation, not

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2) Barthes brilliantly argues that the Eiffel Tower's profound cultural significance emanates from its self-sufficient status: "The Tower can live on itself: One can dream there, eat there, observe there, understand there, marvel there, shop there." The Tower's polyphony of functions, Barthes concludes, fulfills this most heroic of all human wishes to be autonomous and auto-archical.

layered symbols that lure penetration. The Mad Hatter's madness, after all, forms no pattern, generates no repetition. When Alice asks him what happens when he has returned, full circle, to the head of the table, he has no answer and can only redirect the subject of their conversation. The Mad Hatter's inability to answer reflects a larger tendency in the narratives to skim surfaces and deflect inquiry. Throughout both stories Alice continually asks "What will happen next?" but Carroll always accelerates his narrative and whisks us to a new scene before Alice's question can be answered.

In much Victorian fiction the movement into secret enclosures begins as a retreat from the urban world but develops, ultimately, into an act of self-exploration. But this is not true of Carroll's fiction. Indeed, the many instances in the Alice stories of characters positioned with their heads facing downwards betokens repellence, not introspection.

The spatial imagery and objects that fill Wonderland and the Looking-Glass world are similarly misleading. Hidden doors, dark tunnels, ungraspable keys and dense woods all create an architecture crowded with secret spaces and hence suggest an atmosphere of concealment and discovery. Upon closer inspection, however, we see that Alice's dream worlds and secrecy are strangely incompatible. This is a crucial insight, for as we shall see, the Alice narratives lack precisely what other narratives must have in order to hatch a fictive world that contains secrets. In apprehending the reasons for this absence of secrecy in Carroll, we will establish a grammar of terms that can aid us in the project of exploring hidden spaces in other fiction.

Let us first examine the terms of Wonderland's complex spatial dynamics. One notices immediately the fantastic elasticity of space and size that Alice experiences as she travels to the garden. Space is created as she moves through it and closes up behind her as she exits. It is as if space does not exist unless she inhabits it; the hole deepens as she falls through it; doors, keys, and corridors materialize as she needs them.

Suddenly she came upon a little three-legged table, all made of solid glass; there was nothing on it except a tiny golden key. . . . However on the second time round, she came upon a low curtain she had not noticed before, and behind it was a little door. . . . There seemed to be no use in waiting by the little door, so she went back to the table . . . this time she found a little bottle on it. . . (pp. 29-30)(Rackin, 313-26).[3]

That space dissolves as Alice departs from it explains why there is no backward motion in Wonderland, no possibility to return to an established place. Thus Alice must never climb back up the rabbit-hole in order to escape. If we say that there is no reverse motion or return in Wonderland then we have made a crucial discovery: There can be no secrecy or secret spaces in Wonderland for such secrecy demands stability, a

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3) In "Alice's Journey to the End of Night," Donald Rackin argues that Alice's adventure is "a grimly comic trip through the lawless underground that lies just beneath the surface of our constructed universe." Rackin goes on to discuss the delicate form of Carroll's narrative under the pressure of such lawlessness.

constancy that permits return. To hide an object, a person, a story, a memory, implies that there is a constant, an unwavering signifier that can be hidden, which is to say, a floating signifier eludes concealment. Conversely, if there is only backward motion (as in most of Through the Looking-Glass), then there can be no secret places either, for secrecy also requires the forward motion of a sequacious, progressive logic: A must exist before B can hide it.

But location is not the only instability that disallows secrecy in Wonderland and Looking-Glass. If space and motion are irregular, so then is time. Carroll at once creates and undermines the continuous narrative trajectory of traditional fiction. True, both narratives advance in sequent linearity, one scene following logically from another, with Alice's progress to the garden (and the eighth square in Looking-Glass) as the shaping structure and her dream as the outermost frame. But there is a kind of fragmentation--an abrupt skittishness that terminates the scenes--that compromises this linearity and that becomes more prominent in Looking-Glass. Although, as we have noted, Alice continually asks, "What will happen next," she is answered with only the most evasive responses or, more commonly, with sudden changes of scene and location, making the narrative more like a series of dashes than an unbroken linear path (Schilder, 159-68). The scenes in both texts are almost autonomous moments, a succession of vignettes, thus preventing the narratives from accumulating a history from which to form secrets and establish locations. Hence we can see that stability--some kind of continuity of time and permanence of location--is requisite for a narrative to produce secret spaces.

What we have been saying, essentially, is that secrecy demands contextualization, a surrounding set of variables towards which it can stand in relation and in which it can find a location. Secrecy and, more specifically, secret spaces are ensconced within a larger sphere--both spatial and temporal--that a narrative must create. This suggests, further, that autonomy deflects secrecy. Its essence, its status as independence, disconnectedness, disallows the incorporation that is requisite for secret spaces.

We can see also that what Carroll and his critics call the nonsense jargon of the Alice stories is a kind of autonomy of signifiers. For nonsense claims autonomy--detachment from any signifieds. How then can there be secrecy where there is no stable meaning and hence nothing to hide? But this interpretation that meaning is absent from the Alice texts relies upon the reader believing Carroll's insistence that the narratives are hollow of meaning, that they house no secrets, only surfaces. As critics, we have developed a vast collection of essays and articles arguing that the so-called nonsense jargon is itself a concealer of meaning and a shunting of our interpreting glances. Indeed, pure nonsense cannot produce a narrative, and, while the narratives are unusual, they are narratives nevertheless.

The Alice stories, then, articulate a double message: on the one hand, they create the illusion of secrecy, they entice us with answerless riddles and imagery of hidden doors,

unseen passages and ungraspable objects; on the other hand, however, they avert our scrutiny with the characters' nonsense jargon and absurd logic. It is as if the stories draw us towards them and then teasingly turn away. There may be no secrecy, as we have seen, but there is no straightforwardness either.

VII. Conclusion

To sum up my cognitive approach, I can see narrative as something that by necessity is cognitively produced or experienced, rather than as anything that could exist autonomously in its own right. I believe that it represents the operation of a cognitive system and that its characteristics share the properties that are common across cognitive systems generally, so that it can, in turn, be used to better understand the nature of those properties. This particular cognitive perspective distinguishes the present analysis from most other treatments of narrative.

Thus, the "surrounding world" can now be understood more broadly to comprise not just the physical world, but also the conceptualization of the representation that arises from the cultural, producer, and perceiver's cognitions of the full narrative context. Thus, once again, a cognitively based framework of analysis is called for.

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Abstract

Alice in Wonderland and its Language/Cultural Acquisition
Towards Cognitive Culture System

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This paper aims to theorize and practice language learning in that how effectively communicative the culture based English acquisition is for those who are in the environment of English as the Foreign Language. The theorization in this paper is that the characterization of the cognitive culture system may largely parallel to the nature of universality in language. It has the assumption which directs "cultural universal" is effective and communicative way of teaching and learning, just as the "universal grammar" is effective to learn English, especially for those who are EFL. As Chomsky proposed the language system, which is also believed to be an innately determined brain system of human species, I will propose a culture cognitive system in which the narrative functions properly through cognitive interaction between the producer and the perceiver. This paper will attempt to theorize the relationship between cognitive culture system and the narrative cognitive system, which is the basic concept of culture based English acquisition and brain based English one. Cognizing the narrative in order to cognize the culture is the dirving motivation and excitement for English learners to improve their English in the classroom setting. I will exemplify with *Alice in Wonderland*, a cultural contents, some effective teaching strategy of the cognitive narrative to obtain the linguistic and cultural cognition and to be involved in culture cognitive system.

Key words: culture cognitive system, culture based English acquisition, narrative cognition, cognitive language, cognitive anthropology, communication, globalization, *Alice in Wonderland.*

문화인지체계, 문화기반의 영어학습, 서술인지, 인지언어, 인지인류학, 소통, 글로벌화, 『이상한 나라의 앨리스』

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