DP in Copular Sentences[*]

Kab-Yong Park, Tae-Soo Sung

Ⅰ. Introduction

This paper argues that ⅰ) there are no differences with regard to the structural perspectives on both predicational and specificational copular sentences, in that both take the small clause as their complements. ⅱ) the definiteness of pre-copula and post-copula elements is responsible for various interpretations of copular sentences. In other words, both kinds of sentences share only one syntactic structure. Differences, however, arise from whether the DP HEAD bears either [+definite] feature or [−definite] feature. Copulae can parametrically be realized not only as a verb (a word) or an affix (a kind of morpheme) but also a null category on a language-particular basis.[1]

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1) Pustet (2003) points out that while speakers of Indo-European languages will be familiar with verbal copulas, identifying three distinct categories: VERBAL,

The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the structures of DP's. It means that the presence or absence of [definite] feature of their heads plays a crucial role in distinguishing predicational copular sentences and specificational copular ones. It also discusses the referential status of the subject of the specificational copular sentences and argues that the subject of the specificational copular sentences is not a predicate and nonreferential but it appears to partly be definite. Illuminating the presence and the absence of definiteness of a DP, we will be able to formulate the generalization about the impossibility of predicate inversion. According to Mikkelsen (2005), section 3 will focuses on copular sentences of the form 'DP be DP', with recognition that the copular, in many language, is truly cross-categorial and its real scope of inquiry is "XP be XP". I distinguish four types of copular sentences, which are determined by whether the DP's, located in pre-copula and post-copula position have [definite] feature or not. Section 4 is a conclusion.

Here, let me examine that copular sentences with English *be* equally have the small clause as their complements and can be distinguished under the assumption accepting the DP-hypothesis. English has a copula *be* as exemplified in sentences like (1) and (2):

(1) a. Tom is diligent.
   b. Tom is an acrobat.
(2) a. Tom is the mayor of Boston.
   b. A picture of the wall was the cause of the riot. (Moro (1997))

The copula *be* is playing a different role in sentences (1) and (2). For instance, if the element placed before *be* is at the back of *be* and that

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PRONOMINAL and PARTICLE copulas.

placed after *be* is in front of *be*, the resultant sentences are unacceptable for (1a,b) as in (3a,b), but acceptable for (2a,b) as in (4a,b):

(3) a. *Diligent is Tom
    b. *An acrobat is Tom.
(4) a. The mayor of Boston is Tom.
    b. The cause of the riot was a picture of the wall.

Though sentences in (2) and those in (4) again seem to have the same meaning, however, some syntactic differences between them are found. Both of (2) and (4) appear in an ECM constructions as in (5), but only sentences in (2), not in (4), seem to be possible in the small clause construction as in (6); however, the inverse sentence in (4b) is impossible in the small clause construction as in (6b):

(5) a. Tom considers a picture of the wall to be the cause of the riot.
    b. Tom considers the cause of the riot to be a picture of the wall.
(6) a. Tom considers a picture of the wall the cause of the riot.
    b. *Tom considers the cause of the riot a picture of the wall.

The sentences in (1) are called predicational copular sentences, and those in (2) are called specificational copular sentences. There have been two positions as to the differences between sentences in (1) and those in (2). One position claims that the specificational copular sentence is an inverse predicational copular sentence, and that the predicational copular sentence and specificational copular sentence involve one and the same *be*. Heggie (1988), Moro (1977), and Mikkelsen (2005), among others, take this position. They claim that *the cause of the riot* in (4b), for example, is an underlying predicate, and has been inverse from the post-copula

position by a rule called Predicate Raising. The other position claims that the specificational copular sentence is not derived by inversion. Rothestein (2001), for example, claims that there is no inversion involved in (4): the apparent subjects (i.e., *the mayor of Boston* in (4a) and *the cause of the riot* in (4b)) are the original subjects. She proposes that the specificational copular sentence is a subtype of equative sentences. Heycock and Kroch (1997) and Heycock and Kroch (1999) also argue against inversion. The former specifically claims that the IP SPEC in copular sentences is the landing site of the subject of the small sentence complement of I, just as it is the landing site of the subject of the VP complement of I. They propose that both predicational copular sentences and specificational copular sentences exist.

This paper argues that inversion is not involved in sentences like (4). That is, this paper argues that *the Mayor of Boston* in (4a) and *the cause of the riot* in (4b) are not inverted from the post-copula position, but they are an underlying predicate. In this sense, we appear to follow Rothestein (2001)'s assumptions. Yet, this paper argues that both predicational copular sentences and specificational copular sentences have the same structure, possessing one and the same *be*, which links two DP's. In this process, The DP's should be regarded as a defective category, exempted from Case theory and Theta theory. Briefly, the appearance of both predicational copular sentences and specificational copular sentences should be accepted as a secondhand visible phenomenon. The two DPs linked in copular sentences can possess either [+definite] feature or [−definite] feature; at least one of the two DP's, whether it is a pre-copula or a post-copula, can possess [+definite] feature. Yet, there is not a copular sentence where the two DP's all are indefinite. We will make a close discussion on [definite] features of DP in section 3.

I first propose that the English copular be is a raising verb that takes a

small sentence as its complement. The following structure is for the copular sentence which Heggie (1988) analyzes:

(7) [IP [SPEC][VP [V] [NP1] [NP2]]]

In predicational copular sentences and specificational copular sentences, NP1 moves to IP SPEC (with be also moving to I), but in inverse specificational copular sentences, NP1 has moved to IP SPEC (with be also moving to I), NP2 moves to CP SPEC and *be* is raised to C by Subject-Aux Inversion. In fact, Heggie has made some arguments to support her view that NP2 is also a predicate in equative sentences. For example, she claims that it cannot be clefted and is therefore not an argument. Let us take the examples, (8a) as canonical and (9a) as inverse. Heggie (1992:110) observes that in inverse sentence (9a), neither NP can be clefted:

(8) a. John Smith is my doctor.
    b. It's John Smith that is my doctor. (Heggie 1988:81)
    c.*It's my doctor that John Smith is. (Heggie 1988:81)
(9) a. My doctor is John Smith.
    b.*It's my doctor that is John Smith.
    c.*It's John Smith that my doctor is.

Heggie accounts for the ungrammaticality of (8c) and (9b) by assuming a null operator in cleft constructions, which relies on the clefted NP for identification. Moreover, *John Smith* in (8b) can appear in the focus position of the cleft sentence, but *John Smith* in (9c) cannot. Heggie claims that sentence (9b) is ungrammatical because it violates the Doubly-Filled Comp Filter (thus, there is no landing site for clefted

constituent). Heggie (1988) has a technical problem. Rothstein (2001) points out that *the doctor* in (9a) cannot be in the CP SPEC position, and *John Smith* in (9a) cannot be in the IP SPEC position. In case (9a) has a modal auxiliary might as in the following (10), *be* precedes *John Smith*. However, since Subject-Aux Inversion has inverted might, be cannot be inverted before *John Smith*: (10b) should be grammatical. The fact that (10a) is grammatical, but (10b) is ot shows that *the doctor* cannot be in the CP SPEC position and *John Smith* cannot be in the IP SPEC position:

(10) a. The doctor might be John Smith.
　　 b. *The doctor might John Smith be.

Although Heggie (1988)'s justification has some technical problems, I accept her argument that the copular sentences involve the small clause as a complement of the copula, whether they are predicational or specificational.

Secondly, I argue against an 'Inversion' Analysis'. It is possible to propose an analysis of the copular sentences in which both predicational copular sentences and specificational copular sentences are derived from one underlying structure. This idea assumes that basically there is only one structure type, arguing that only one referential DP is possible in copular sentences.

Moro (1997) argues that at most one referential DP is possible in a specificational copular sentence, suggesting the following operation as evidence to predicate raising, as described in (11). In (11a), a wh-phrase cannot be extracted from the first DP, but it can be from the second DP, as shown in (11b,c) respectively. This is expected if the first DP is considered to be the subject, and the second DP is considered to be the complement:

(11) a. [A picture of the wall] was [the cause of the riot].

b.*Which wall was[a picture of t] [the cause of the riot]? (from the first DP)

c. Which riot was[a picture of the wall] [the cause of t]? (from the second DP)

Now consider (12a) below. Wh-extraction is impossible both from the first DP and the second DP. The fact that (12c) is ungrammatical is unexpected if *a picture of which wall* in (12c) is considered to be in the same position as *the cause of which riot* in (11c).

(12) a. [The cause of the riot] was[a picture of the wall].

b.*Which riot was [the cause of t] [a picture of the wall]? (from the first DP)

c.*Which wall was [the cause of the riot] [a picture of t]? (from the second DP)

Moro argues that if in (12c), *a picture of which wall* is considered to be the subject of the small clause, and *the cause of the riot* is the predicate of the small clause and inverted to the IP SPEC position, the facts about (12b, c) can be accounted for. Moro claims that with this assumption, *the cause of which riot* in (12c) and *a picture of which wall* in (12c) are in the same type of position, i.e., in a left-branch position, as seen in (14b,d).

(14) a. [C[[the cause of [which riot]]...]]

b. [[[the cause of which riot]I[be[[a picture of the wall]]]]]]

c. [V[[a picture of [which wall]]...]]

d. [[[the cause of the riot]I[be[[a picture of which wall]]]]]]

Moro argues that not only (11b) and (12b) but also (12c) are ungrammatical because they all violate the subjacency condition. Moro thus can account for the contrast between (11c) and (12c) by assuming that in (12a), *a picture of the wall* is the underlying subject of the small clause, and *the cause of the riot* is the underlying predicate and has been inverse from the predicate position to the IP SPEC position.

Another argument that English copular sentences involve only one copula and a common inversion derivation (such as predicate raising), which creates the variations in relation to copular sentences is made by Heycock (1992) and Moro (1997). They propose that in inverse copular sentences, the small clause subject remains in situ and the small clause predicate raises. They claim that both (14b) and (14c) are derived from (14a) (Heycock 1992: 99):

(14) a. [IP e is [SC the prime minister [DP the real problem]]]
    b. The prime minister is the real problem.   canonical
    c. The real problem is the prime minister.   inverse

Heycock (1992:99) suggests (15) as the structure for an inverse sentence like (14c):

(15)[IP [the real problem]i [IP is [VP ti [VP tv [DP [DP the prime minister] ti]]]]]

Note that this analysis assumes that *the prime minister* is the underlying subject. Here, the small clause predicate raises to matrix IP SPEC via VP SPEC. Heycock argues that the fact that the predicate raises first to VP SPEC means that this is an instance of A-movement, since VP SPEC is always an A-position.[2]

Despite these attempts to consider one of the two referential DP's in the specificational copular sentences to be a predicate DP, we cannot overlook the fact that two referential DP's are possible in the copular sentences from Rapoport (1978) like the following:

(16) a. Mr. Smith is Mary.
　　 b. I've just found out that Mr. Smith, who I work with, is Mary, who I've been dating.

Non-restrictive relatives are possible only with referential DPs. In (16), the non-restrictive relatives referring back to *Mr. Smith* and *Mary* are grammatical. Thus both DP's *Mr. Smith* and *Mary* are referential, denoting a certain individual in the world. Furthermore, Moro (1997)'s argument throughout (16) that at most one referential DP is possible in a specificational copular sentence should prove false. Rothstein (2001) also argues that the pre-copula DP in (17) is not an inverse predicate unlike Moro (1997)'s claim. She notes that while a predicative expression can be modified by non-restrictive relative clauses headed by which as (18a), the pre-copula DP in specificational copular sentences can be modified by non-restrictive relative clauses by who as (18b):

(17) The leader is Mary.
(18) a. They think John mean, which is a horrible thing to be.
　　 b. The (alleged) murder, who was acquitted yesterday, is John.
　　 CF. The murderer, which is a horrible thing to be, is John.

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2) This is supported by the fact that this movement can feed further A-movement, for example if it then goes on to raise to subject position of a raising verb as in (i) (Heycock 1992:99):
(i) The real problem seems to be the prime minister.

Rothstein argues that the fact that the pre-copula DP in a specificational copular sentence can be the antecedent of a pronoun as (19) also shows that it is not an inverse predicate.

(19) Now I realize that the murderer was John. He was wearing size 12 shoes and only John has feet that size.

She argues that the pre-copula DP of (17) behaves as an argument, and that it is the subject of the sentence.

I conclude that both the predicational copular sentences and the specificational copular sentences cannot be assimilated on the basis of predicate raising and that the referentiality of DP's in copular sentences decides whether a copular sentence is predicational or specificational. Also, there are no inverse copular sentences.

Ⅱ. Proposals

I suggest that specific and nonspecific noun phrases both have a DP construction. I further propose that determiners are placed in only one position within DP, based on (a) their semantic nature (cf., strong vs. weak), and (b) the semantic reading of the DP within the sentence with respect to specificity. I start the discussion with an introduction to the DP Hypothesis and the semantics of NP specifiers.

1. The DP-Hypothesis

I assume that the determiner heads a phrase of its own, a determiner phrase or DP, which takes the projection of the NP as its complement:

```
(20)     DP
        /  \
       D    NP
       |    |
      the   man
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
Since Abney (1987), The so-called DP Hypothesis has gained in the field of Government and Binding syntax. This hypothesis proposes that a nominal expression is headed by a determiner that takes a noun phrase as its complement. Under this hypothesis, the phrase *Mary's collection* in (21) below is a DP and headed by a possessive 's rather than a determiner. The possessive 's D heading the DP takes collection as its NP complement. Comparing an DP containing a possessor with a DP containing a determiner, as far as their syntactic distribution goes, DPs containing a possessor behave exactly like DP's containing a determiner. If there is no syntactic difference between the two, they don't seem to belong to different categories. The possessive affix, expressed by -'s in English, functions as a determiner:

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(21)    DP
       /     \
     DP   /     \
      |   D    NP
    Mary  |     |
         's   collection
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
The hypothesis that the possessive element is a D is attractive, since it accounts for the fact that this element is in complementary distribution with (other) determiners: We cannot have both a possessor and a determiner, as shown by (22). According to (21), this is because the possessive element occupies the same position in the structure as the one in which determiners go.

(22) a. *John's the collection
    b. *a Mary's hat

Note that the element in the DP SPEC in (21) can be a full phrase, as expected for specifiers:

(23) a. [the king of England]'s head
    b. [my neighbour]'s new car

We can assume that when the phrase in the DP SPEC is the Agent argument of the noun, it has moved DP SPEC from the NP SPEC, in analogy with subject raising from VP SPEC to IP SPEC in sentences. Notice that some determiners can be 'silent' in English. Mass nouns and plural indefinites are not accompanied by an overt determiner (wine is red, elephants have a long memory).[3]

Nevertheless, the syntactic behaviour of phrases built around such nouns is not different from that of DP's with an overt determiner. I therefore

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3) The NP selected for by the null determiner are headed by plural (women) and mass (mankind). It exposes a serious weakness of the DP Hypothesis: the inability of the analysis to explain a structure without positing an element that does not exist in the surface form (the null determiner).
(i) a. Φ women's rights (are inalienable.)
   b. Φ mankind's rights (are inalienable.)

assume that such phrases are DP's as well, containing a null determiner. The specifier DP could be headed by the determiners (such as a, the, my, her, etc.), each of which requires an NP complement.

2. Specificity

In this section, I suggest that specific and nonspecific NP's both have a DP construction. I further propose that determiners are placed in only one position of DP HEAD.

Karimi (1999b) points out that Enç (1991) defines definite and specific NP's in terms of their relation to previously established discourse referents. Enç states that definite NP's require "strong antecedents." This means that there is an "identity" relation between them and their discourse referents. Specific NP's, on the other hand, are involved in a looser relation to already established discourse referents: their link to discourse indicates an "inclusion" relation. Therefore, they require "week antecedents." Within the framework proposed by Enç, definite NPs are always specific, while indefinite NP's are ambiguous with respect to specificity: they are specific if they denotes a "partitive or inclusion" relation to previously established discourse, and nonspecific if they lack an antecedent in the discourse altogether. In sum, specific NP's, definite or indefinite, have one feature in common: they are linked to previously established discourse referents. On the other hand, as for nonspecific NP's, they cannot be linked to the previous discourse, and hence denote novelty of reference. Proper names, pronouns, and noun phrases modified by a demonstrative or a definite article are definite, and thus specific. Certain indefinites are predicted to be specific, such as partitives and universal quantifiers. In this paper, we will employ 'specificity' in the sense of Enç's definition.

The following classic examples exhibit the contrast between specific and nonspecific NP's:

(24)a. Who did you see pictures of e?
    b. Who did you see a picture of e?
    c. Who did you see many/several/some pictures of e?
    d. *Who did you see the/that/this/John's pictures of e?
    e. *Who did you see every/most/each/ picture(s) of e?

Those in (24a-c) are nonspecific, while the ones in (24d-e) are specific. These examples show that extraction is possible only out of nonspecific NPs.

In order to show the structural difference on extraction out of specific/nonspecific NPs, Kirimi (1999b) assumes a DP for both specific and nonspecific NP's. Namely, Kirimi suggests that definite and indefinite determiners occupy two different positions within the DP, and that the deviation of the ill-formed sentences in (24) follows from a structural difference between the two types of DP's, a syntactic difference that is driven by semantic properties of the determiner phrase. This difference is based on the inherent nature of the determiner, or the semantic interpretation of the indefinite DP within the sentence. Kirimi claims that extraction is possible only when the DP SPEC is not lexically filled. Otherwise, the specific DP will become an island, blocking the extraction. The implication of this analysis is that the semantic property of a DP requires a structural specification in order to block the syntactic movement of a lexical element.

Before Kirimi (1999b), Milsark (1974) suggests that there are two types of determiners: weak and strong. The following examples illustrate these two types:

(25) There is/are a/some/a few/three flower (flowers) in this garden.
(26) *There is/are the/every/all/most flower (flowers) in this garden.

The determiners in (25) represent the weak type: they are ambiguous between a presuppose the existence of the entities they are applied to. Those in (26) represent the strong type. Following Milsark (1974), Bowers (1988) makes a distinction between weak and strong noun phrases based on their determiners: the noun phrases in (24b-c) are considered to be weak, whereas those in (24d-e) are classified as strong.

Based on the findings described above, Kirimi proposes the structure in (27), where selects a noun phrase as its complement, suggesting that this structure represents both specific and nonspecific noun phrases:

```
(27)          DP
           /      \
       SPEC   /    \
         |    D      NP
      Fred's  |      |
      the    many    N
      those  few
      which  several
      each/all numerals
```

I accept Kirimi (1999b)'s argument for the configuration in (27) to show that the presence of a lexical element or a specific feature in the DP SPEC implies specificity of the noun phrase. But a question happens in respect to whether the specific phrases in DP SPEC are maximal phrases and whether the non-specific phrases in DP HEAD are unprojected heads. This question is attributed to the fact that the distribution of determiners

has not yet been formulated in details in linguistic theories. In order to extract a more reasonable description, a variety of studies on the distribution of definite/indefinite elements are required. But this paper assumes that in (27), 'Fred' is located in DP SPEC and the others and 's, in DP HEAD. Determiners, whether definite or indefinite, are to determine the definiteness of all DP's.[4]

Here I suggest that all the phrases in (27) whether they are specific or non-specific should be located in DP HEAD. Of course, some have [+definite] feature and others, [−definite] feature. The phrases in DP HEAD:

```
(28)          DP
           /      \
      SPEC     /     \
        |      D       NP
               |        |
              's        N
           many/a/the
            few/those
          several/which
         numeral/each/all


(29)          DP
           /      \
      SPEC     /     \
        |      D       NP
        X  [α definite]  |
                         N
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4) In more details, refer to Westerstahl (1985), Prince (1992), Ward (1998), etc.

A structural difference takes place on the basis of extraction out of definite/indefinite DP's. I assumes a DP for both definite and indefinite DPs. That is, definite and indefinite determiners occupy only one position, DP HEAD, within the DP, and that the ill-formed sentences in (24d-e) involve the extraction out of definite DPs, driven by semantic properties of the DP HEAD. In this case, definite DPs are regarded as an Island.

This difference is based on the inherent nature of the determiner, or the semantic interpretation of the indefinite DP within the sentence. Kirimi also claims that extraction is possible only when the DP SPEC is not lexically filled. Otherwise, the specific DP will become an island, blocking the extraction. But I will revise Kirimi's claim. Thus, extraction is permitted only when the DP HEAD is indefinite. The implication of this analysis is that the semantic property of a DP requires a structural specification in order to block the syntactic movement of a lexical element.

Ⅲ. Types of Copular Sentences

Mikkelsen (2005) assumes that copular sentences are a minor sentence type in which the contentful predicate is not a verb but some other category such AP, NP, or PP. Also, Mikkelsen focuses on copular sentences of the form 'NP be NP', admitting that it should be recognized that the copular, at least in many languages, is truly cross-categorial and hence that the real scope of inquiry is "XP be XP' (or 'XP XP' for languages that lack a copula, though excluding regular verbal predication). Mikkelsen, pointing the taxonomy proposed in Higgins (1979:204-293), distinguishes four types of copular sentences:

(30) Predicational

    a. The hat is big.

    b. The hat/present/thing I bought for Harvey is big.

    d. What I bought for Harvey is big.

(31) Specificational

    a. The director of Anatomy of a Murder is Otto Preminger.

    b. The only director/person/one I met was Otto Preminger.

    d. Who I met was Otto Preminger.

(32) Identificational

    a. That (woman) is Sylvia.

    b. That (stuff) is DDT.

(33) Equative

    a. Sylvia Obernauer is HER.

    b. Cicero is Tully.

Mikkelsen claims that predicational copular sentences in (30) show that they predicate a property of the subject referent. In this respect, actually, they appear like non-copular sentences, though they obviously differ from these in that the property is contributed entirely by the predicate complement. Following our intuition, the other three kinds of copular sentences do not involve predication. Equatives in (33) equate the referents of the two expressions flanking the copula. Neither is predicated of the other. Specificational copular sentences in (31) involve valuing of a variable: the subject expression sets up a variable (the x that directed *Anatomy of a Murder* in (31a) and the post-copula expression provides the value for that variable. Identificational sentences in (32) are different again, in the sense that they typically involve a demonstrative subject and according to Higgins "are typically used for teaching the names of people or of things". Concerning the detailed discussion, refer to Mikkelsen

(1998).

Given the preceding discussion of (30-33), in terms of referentiality, the profile of each kind can be characterized as in (34):

(34)   NP1   copula   NP2
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        equative   referential   referential
        predicational referential   non-referential
        specificational non-referential   referential

The term specificational derives from the intuition that these sentences are used to specify who (or what) someone (or something) is, rather than to say anything about that person (or entity). Thus the above (29a) is used to say who directed a particular movie, not to say something about that person. Evidence from the non-referential status of the subject of specificational copular sentences comes from pronominalization. *He* or *she* are used to pronominalize referential DP's, and *it* and *that* are used to pronominalize non-referential DP's, including predicative DP's. There are two environments in association with pronominalization to probe the semantic type of copular subjects (Tag questions and Left dislocation structures). First, the form of the pronoun in a tag question is determined by the subject of the tagged sentence. In tag questions, predicational copular sentence in (35) has a referential subject such as *she*; specificational copular sentence in (36) has a predicative subject such as *it*:

(35) [The lead actress in that movie] is Swedish, isn't {she/*it}?
(36) [The lead actress in that movie] is Ingrid Bergman, isn't it?

As for left dislocation, it leaves resumptive pronoun inside CP. Using subject left dislocation to probe semantic type of copular subjects, the predicational copular sentence in (37) has a referential subject such as *she*; the specificational copular sentence in (38) has a predicative subject such as *it* or *that*:

(37) The lead actress in that movie, she/*it/*that is Swedish.
(38) The lead actress in that movie, it/that is Ingrid Bergman.

In (35) and (36), the pronouns are in a tag question and these are known to be controlled by the subject of the tagged sentence; in (37) and (38), the pronouns are controlled by the left-dislocated subject. Mikkelsen (2005:64-86) argues that this is evidence that the subject of specificational copular sentences is non-referential and the subject of predicational copular sentence is referential. That is, Only DP's capabale of being predicative (property-denoting) can occur as subject of specificational copular sentences.

On the other hand, Williams (1997)'s argument is different from Mikkelson (2005)'s in that he notes that in specificational copular sentences such as (39), the first DP is less known or less directly knowable. In (39), we know who *John* is, but wonder who *the mayor* is, and the specificational copular sentences tells who the mayor is:

(39) The mayor is John.

Williams notes that the small clause construction with *consider* corresponding to (39) is ungrammatical as in (40a), although (40b), which corresponds to (40c), is grammatical.

(40) a. *I consider the Mayor John.
  b. I consider John the Mayor.
  c. John is the Mayor.

The same thing can be said about a pair of sentences in (41), which are not synonymous as Williams notes: the first DP in each sentence is known but the identity of the second DP is not known.

(41) a. I consider John Bill.
  b. I consider Bill John.

Williams's claim about the specificational copular sentences and their occurrences in the small clause construction is interpreted as follows. If a clause contains two DP's, the first DP in the underlying structure is a known DP and the second DP is a less known DP. In the small clause construction, that order is always preserved.

 Finally, we can see that the pre-copula DP and the post-copula DP are realized as either [+definite] or [-definite] based on under which context they appear.

Ⅳ. Conclusion

 This paper argues that i) there are no differences with regard to the structural perspectives on both predicational and specificational copular sentences, in that both take the small clause as their complements. ii) the difiniteness of pre-copula and post-copula DP's is responsible for various interpretations of copular sentences. In other words, both sorts of sentences are equally represented on the basis of their own syntactic

structures. Differences, however, arise from whether the heads of syntactic categories (such as DP) bear [+definite] features. Copulae can parametrically be realized as a verb (a word) or an affix (a kind of morpheme) on a language-particular basis.,

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Abstract

DP in Copular Sentences

Kab-Yong Park, Tae-Soo Sung

   This paper claims that there is only one copular verb *be* and all copular constructions share the same structure. In English, predicational copular sentences and specificational copular sentences show the difference on the basis of whether pre-copula DP Head and post-copula DP Head have [definite] feature or not, driven by semantic properties of the DP HEAD. This argument is distinguished from the two precedent analyses on copular sentences. Heggie (1988), Moro(1977), and Mikkelsen (2005), among others, claim that the specificational copular sentence is an inverse predicational copular sentence, and that the predicational copular sentence and specificational copular sentence involve one and the same be. The other position, including Rothestein (2001), claims that the specificational copular sentence is not derived by inversion. Rothestein (2001) proposes that the specificational copular sentence is a subtype of equative sentences. The specificational copular sentence has the different structure from the predicational copular sentence.

Key words: predicational copular sentence, specificational copular sentence,
            DP hypothesis, specificity
            술어적계사 구문, 한정적계사 구문, DP 가설, 한정성

이름: 박갑용
소속: 남서울대학교 영어과
주소: 충남 천안시 성환읍 매주리 21번지 남서울대학교
이메일: kpark@nsu.sc.kr

이름: 성태수
소속: 남서울대학교 영어과
주소: 충남 천안시 성환읍 매주리 21번지 남서울대학교
이메일: yesitiso@hanmail.net