

# Presupposition and Rules for Anaphora

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## 1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to examine varieties of presupposition, investigate the relation between presupposition and anaphora, and explore the possibility of finding out rules for anaphora. Kripke (2009) points out that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. He claims that we need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to the corresponding pronominal theory. However, he does not suggest any particular anaphora rules for presupposition. To formulate adequate anaphora rules for presupposition, we should examine characteristics of presupposition and find out a general principle for presupposition. Above all, I will argue that lots of problems related to presupposition will be adequately solved when we take pragmatic aspects into account. This argument is also supported by Stalnaker (1973). Therefore, I will analyze characteristics of presupposition and propose

presuppositional anaphora rules, mainly focusing on pragmatic aspects. Besides, I will argue that this analysis will work better than the other two analyses based on syntactic and semantic aspects.

## 2. Kinds of Presuppositions

Soames (1982: 485) tells us what it means to say that a speaker, utterance, or sentence presupposes something.

(1) *Speaker Presupposition*

A member S of a conversation presupposes a proposition P at a time t iff at t S believes or assumes

- a. P;
- b. that the other members of the conversation also believe or assume P; and
- c. that the other members of the conversation recognize that S believes or assumes (a) and (b).

This means that a person presupposes a proposition at a given point in a conversation just in case he believes that proposition to be one that the conversational participants already accept as part of the shared background information against which the conversation takes place. Soames calls this relation ‘speaker presupposition’ and adds that it is not limited to speakers, but is defined for conversational participants generally. Soames points out that in order for a person to presuppose a proposition P, it is not necessary that he have said or done anything to indicate that P is being presupposed.<sup>1)</sup> This indicates that propositions that are generally regarded to be matters of common knowledge are also presuppositions for most

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1) This argument is also supported by Stalnaker (1973: 449).

participants in most conversations.

The form and content of certain sentences sometimes constitute conventional means for indicating that the utterer is taking certain propositions for granted. We can make this idea clear by defining general notions of utterance and sentential presupposition. Before we define these notions, we need to note the concept of a conversational context at a time  $t$ .

(2) *Conversational Context*

The conversational context at  $t$  = the set of propositions  $P$  such that at  $t$  speakers and hearers

- a. believe or assume  $P$ ; and
- b. recognize this about each other.

[Soames 1982: 486]

The conversational context (2) at a moment of utterance constitutes the background information, common to speakers and hearers, and the utterance is evaluated against it. On the basis of this, Soames (1982: 486) defines the notions of utterance and sentential presupposition.<sup>2)</sup>

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2) These definitions differ slightly from those of Soames (1979) and he replaces them. Soames (1979: 631) gives the following definitions.

(i) *Speaker Presupposition*

A speaker  $X$  presupposes a proposition  $P$  (at time  $t$ ) iff (at time  $t$ )

- a.  $X$  assumes  $P$ , and
- b.  $X$  assumes that his audience either already accepts  $P$ , or is prepared to treat it as uncontroversial.

(ii) *Sentential Presupposition*

A sentence  $S$  of a language  $L$  presupposes a proposition  $P$  iff uttering  $S$  in  $L$  indicates that one is presupposing  $P$ .

(iii) *Logical Presupposition*

A proposition  $P$  logically presupposes a proposition  $Q$  iff the truth of  $Q$  is a necessary condition for  $P$  to be either true or false.

(3) *Utterance Presupposition*

An utterance U presupposes P (at t) iff one can reasonably infer from U that the speaker S accepts P and regards it as uncontroversial, either because

- a. S thinks that it is already part of the conversational context at t, or because
- b. S thinks that the audience is prepared to add it, without objection, to the context against which U is evaluated.

(4) *Sentential Presupposition*

A sentence S presupposes P iff normal utterances of S presuppose P.

Here, Soames puts more emphasis on the notion of an utterance presupposition, since it is used to characterize sentential presupposition and is also closely related to speaker presupposition.

In some cases, speakers use utterance presuppositions to introduce new information. In such cases, the speaker expects or wishes the information as a presupposition to be regarded as uncontroversial. Consider the following sentence (5) from Soames (1982: 486).

- (5) My son is living proof that there is no species-universal innate linguistic knowledge.

A speaker might utter (5) in a conversation even when he realizes that his hearers do not already know that which (5) presupposes, i.e., that the speaker has a son. It seems clear that the speaker does not regard the proposition presupposed as potentially controversial.

In connection with introducing new information, Soames (1982) claims that the speaker uses it in the form of presupposition, rather than an explicit assertion, for brevity and convenience. I do not deny his claim, but I want to point out that every speaker may prefer this kind of presupposition to a simple assertion in case that his audience knows or

assumes that he is married and may have children.

This kind of presupposition can be used in a kind of pretense which serves special conversational purposes. Consider the following example sentence (6) from Soames (1982: 487).

(6) Yes, and his wife is very attractive, too.

One can imagine contexts where the utterance (6) might be intended to convey information about someone's marital status, without explicitly acknowledging an embarrassing ignorance or interest on the part of the hearer. In this example, the utterance has such an effect because the information regarding marital status is presupposed.

As we have seen in (5) and (6), a speaker's utterance presupposes a proposition, even though the speaker himself does not presuppose it in the sense mentioned previously. As we have just seen, utterance presuppositions are standard devices for indicating propositions that the speaker intends to have the status of common background assumptions among the conversational participants. In each case, the speaker utters a sentence that presupposes P, knowing that his audience will reason as in (7).

- (7) a. The speaker's utterance presupposes P.  
 b. Since the speaker knows that the actual conversational context at the time of his utterance does not include P, he must expect me not to take issue with P, but to add it to the context and treat it on a par with propositions we have been presupposing all along.

Since an utterance that presupposes P indicates that the speaker presupposes P, it always indicates that the speaker is taking P for granted.

As we have seen so far, speaker, utterance, and sentential

presupposition are all pragmatically explained. However, we should point out that the reason why certain utterances and sentences have certain presuppositions is naturally semantic or syntactic.

### 3. Presupposition and Anaphora

In the preceding section, we examined various kinds of presuppositions. We also saw that a speaker uses them for various purposes. In this section, we deal with presupposition in relation to anaphora.

Kripke (2009) argues that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements, though writers on presupposition traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. In this context, Kripke tries to account for what is called in the linguistics literature “the projection problem for presupposition.” That problem is: if we have a logically complex sentence whose clauses bear certain presuppositions, how do we compute the presuppositions of the whole? Kripke (2009: 368) gives the following examples from Soames (1982: 488) as a standard list of different kinds of presupposition.

- |   |               |
|---|---------------|
| (8) Bill regrets lying to his parents.          | (Factive)     |
| P: Bill has lied to his parents.                |               |
| (9) Ivan has stopped beating his wife.          | (Aspectual)   |
| P: Ivan has beaten his wife.                    |               |
| (10) Andy met with the PLO again today.         | (Iterative)   |
| P: Andy met with the PLO before.                |               |
| (11) It was in August that we left Connecticut. | (Cleft)       |
| P: We left Connecticut.                         |               |
| (12) What John destroyed was his typewriter.    | (Pseudocleft) |
| P: John destroyed something.                    |               |

- (13) *Billy* is guilty, too.<sup>3)</sup> (Too)  
 P: Someone other than Billy is guilty.
- (14) All of John's children are asleep. (Certain quantifiers)  
 P: John has children.
- (15) The king of France is in hiding. (Referential)  
 P: There is a king of France.

Frege (1892) states that the last of these examples is the paradigmatic case. However, Stalnaker (1973, 1974) and Lewis (1979) introduce notions such as the presuppositions of a speaker or of the participants in a conversation. The idea focuses on pragmatic aspects. It is that you should not make an utterance which involves a presupposition if it is not in the background assumptions of the participants in the conversation. This rule seems to be violated in some cases, as we have seen in example sentence (5), and Stalnaker and Lewis recognize this. For instance, you can say that you are going to meet your sister, and the presupposition that you have a sister is thereby introduced. This is called “accommodation” by Stalnaker. It is argued that in such cases, conversational participants recognize that the existing conversational context does not satisfy the presuppositional requirements of the utterance, but accommodate the speaker by adding the required information to bring the context into harmony with the presuppositional rule. It is said that speakers exploit this process when they think the required information will be agreed upon as uncontroversial by all hands.<sup>4)</sup>

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3) The italicized word is used to indicate that it is the focus element in the case of *too*.

4) Kripke (2009: 369) points out that this formulation does not always work. According to him, a problem is that a French monarchist might belligerently say to a republican, “No matter what you republicans say, I met the king of France last week.” Kripke claims that here it isn't taken to be uncontroversial or expected to be uncontroversial that there is a king of France. I think that the general picture sketched above should be retained, because I regard Kripke's

Kripke (2009) explains that an important anaphoric element that is carried by the presuppositional terms themselves is left out of the standard picture. Therefore, he tries to sketch considerations relevant to the development of a theory of presuppositional anaphora. Consider the following example from Kripke (2009: 371).

(16) If Herb comes to the party, *the boss* will come, too.

According to the usual view, the presupposition of the consequent is that someone other than the boss will come to the party. On the contrary, Kripke argues that the presupposition of the consequent is that Herb is not the boss. The difference between these two views is that Kripke's view gives a presupposition to the consequent that cannot be understood in isolation from the antecedent.

To support this belief, Kripke (2009: 371) gives the Karttunen and Peters (1979) algorithm for the presupposition of conditionals.

(17)  $(A_p \ \& \ (A_\alpha \supset B_p))$

How can the standard algorithm explain the presuppositions here? According to the Karttunen and Peters theory, the presupposition of the consequent in (16) is *someone other than the boss will come* and the presupposition of the entire conditional is *if Herb comes, someone other than the boss will come*. In relation to the sentence (16), Kripke claims that a natural explanation would be that the speaker takes for granted that Herb is not the boss.

In general, it seems that presupposition arises from the anaphoric requirement. For instance, when one says *too*, one refers to some parallel

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example here as peripheral to this discussion.



information that is either in another clause or in the context. Since we need a theory for presuppositional anaphora parallel to that for pronominal anaphora, let us consider the following example from Kripke (2009: 373).

(18) *Sam* is having dinner in New York tonight, too.

Imagine (18) as uttered out of the blue. No context is being presupposed in which we are concerned with anyone else having dinner in New York. On the usual view, the presupposition of (18) is that someone other than Sam is having dinner in New York tonight. However, this is wrong. Note that a sentence is appropriate as long as its presuppositions are fulfilled. In this respect, the usual view predicts that the sentence (18) is invariably appropriate without any special context. In other words, surely many people are having dinner in New York on a given night. For this reason, the hearer will say, “ ‘Too’ ? What do you mean, ‘too’ ? What person or persons do you have in mind?”

Let us consider another example similar to (18).

(19) Priscilla is eating supper, again. [Kripke 2009: 373]

On the usual view, the presupposition is that Priscilla has eaten supper before. Note that this can easily be assumed if she is a grown woman. In this respect, an utterance of (19) should invariably be perfectly appropriate. However, in the absence of any special background, the natural reaction to such an utterance will be “What do you mean, ‘again’ ? Maybe she had supper an hour ago, also? Are you suggesting that she is bulimic? Or is she on a diet where she is supposed to skip supper and she has broken it recently and now has broken it again? What is going on here?” Here, the usual prediction is also incorrect.

To account for sentences like (18) and (19), Kripke (2009: 373)

proposes that we distinguish between two types of context: a *salient* or *active* context and a *passive* context. An active context is material that has been explicitly mentioned in the conversation, or is on people's minds and is known to be on people's minds, or is highly salient in some way. The active context may be a set of questions or topics as well as assertions. The active context is the kind of thing that makes uses of *again* and *too* appropriate. Unlike the active context, a passive context consists of general background information available to the speakers that is not taken as relevant or on their minds. Relying on this distinction, we can easily explain the examples (16), (18) and (19). For instance, we can explain that *too* or *again* should refer to a parallel element, i.e., something parallel to the boss's coming to the party, Sam's having dinner in New York, or Priscilla's eating supper. In other words, this parallel element must come from the active context or from other clauses in the assertion in question. It cannot come merely from the passive context. It is not sufficient that they are merely well known. This fact may play an important role in my formulation of presuppositional anaphora in later discussions in section 4.

In relation to the sentence (16), Kripke's argument was that Herb is not the boss. Kripke argues that the presupposition should be attached to the consequent clause containing the presuppositional element *too* rather than to the whole conditional. To support this argument, he gives the following example (20).

- (20) If Nancy does not win the contest and the winner comes to our party,  
*Nancy* will come, too.

Here, according to Kripke's proposal, the presupposition is that Nancy will not be the winner. According to Karttunen and Peters, if the presupposition is attached to the consequent, it is "filtered out" and need not be presupposed by the speaker who utters the entire conditional. The

entire conditional does not presuppose that Nancy will not win. This presupposition is explicitly stated in the antecedent, and thus need not be presupposed by the speaker who utters the conditional. Therefore, sentence (20) is acceptable without any presupposition in advance that Nancy will not be the winner, and, in fact, is explicitly compatible with the idea that Nancy may well win.

So far, we have seen that some presuppositional elements may be anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. Besides, we have also seen that a sentence may have different presuppositions when it is observed by different linguists. However, we have also noticed that linguistically important presuppositions come from the active context. On this basis, it seems possible for us to capture a parallel relation between a presupposition and its antecedent.

## 4. Rules for Presuppositional Anaphora

In the preceding section, we saw the anaphoric relation of presupposition. In this section, we will explore the possibility of establishing a presuppositional anaphora theory. To find out rules for presuppositional anaphora, we will examine the relation between presupposition and its anaphor on the syntactic basis in section 4.1., on the semantic basis in section 4.2., and then on the pragmatic basis in section 4.3.

### 4.1. Syntactic Analysis

Gazdar (1976) defines the potential presuppositions of sentences in terms of their components and constructions as if potential presuppositions

were something given to us by the lexicon and the syntax. Similarly, Bickerton (1979) suggests that the presupposition phenomenon arises because of certain syntactic facts, and tries to show that presuppositions are given by the nature of syntax. To justify this argument, Bickerton (1979: 237) gives the following confirmatory tag sentences.

- (21) John says that Mary is pregnant, which she is.
- (22) \*John regrets that Mary is pregnant, which she is.
- (23) John regrets that Mary is pregnant, which she is through no fault of her own.

Bickerton explains that (21) is good because the tag adds a piece of information which was not recoverable from the original sentence, which merely reports John's assertion that a certain situation exists. On the contrary, in (22), no new information is added. In other words, the fact that Mary is pregnant is implicit in the use of the verb *regret*. Unlike (22), (23) is good because here the tag includes additional information about Mary's condition. On the basis of these data, Bickerton gives the following general principle of language.

- (24) The second member of a pair of conjoined sentences must add substantive information if the resulting sentence is to be well formed.

As we have seen so far, some presupposition phenomenon arises from certain syntactic facts.

This fact is also supported by the examples (11) and (12), where presuppositions occur because of particular structural reasons. In (11), the presupposition takes place in the cleft sentence, and in (12), it occurs in the pseudo-cleft sentence. A syntactic analysis like this does not have a particular problem in accounting for presuppositions arising from a

particular syntactic condition. However, this analysis has difficulty in accounting for the examples other than (11) and (12) in the examples (8–15). All the examples discussed above show that we should take into account the presuppositions occurring from certain structural conditions when we try to find out adequate rules for presuppositional anaphora.

## 4.2. Semantic Analysis

Generally, linguists dealing with presupposition begin not with an abstract account, but with some paradigm cases of a presumed relation between sentences. For instance, sentences with factive verbs such as *know* and *regret* presuppose the truth of the proposition expressed by the nominalized sentence which is the complement of the verb. Past tense subjunctive conditional statements presuppose the falsity of the antecedent, and perhaps also of the consequent. Words like *few*, *even*, *only*, *again*, *stop*, *pretend*, *continue*, *resume*, *before*, and *after* give rise to presuppositions in sentences in which they occur. What is important here is that these cases are based on the intuitive idea of presupposition, together with a few rough generalizations like the following: generally, if a statement A has a particular presupposition, then so does the denial of A, as well as the statement that says that it *might* be that A. So that if 'Ted is the only man who could have won' presupposes that Ted could have won, then so does 'Ted is not the only man who could have won', as well as 'Ted might be the only man who could have won'.

As we saw in examples (8–15), factives, aspectual expressions, iterative expressions, *too*, certain quantifiers, and referential expressions have semantic presuppositions. In some examples, the occurrence of presupposition is related to the meaning of a particular word. For example, in example (8), the word *regret* presupposes that some action has been

done by somebody. In example (10), the iterative word *again* presupposes that something has already occurred before a particular time. In example (13), the word *too* presupposes that somebody other than a particular person is already guilty. In example (14), the word *all* presupposes that somebody has two or more people. Besides, in example (15), the referential expression *the king of France* presupposes that there exists a king in France. All these examples make it clear that some words themselves have their own presuppositions due to their own meanings.

Next, let us examine how sentences like the following can be accounted for by semantic analysis in relation to presuppositional anaphora.

(25) If Herb comes to the party, *the boss* will come, too. (= (16))

As we saw previously, according to the usual view, the presupposition of the consequent is that someone other than the boss will come to the party. Unlike this, Kripke's view is that the presupposition of the consequent is that Herb is not the boss. Note again that Kripke's view gives a presupposition to the consequent that cannot be understood in isolation from the antecedent. In semantic aspects, I agree to both views, i.e., the usual view and Kripke's view, because we can get the two presuppositions from example (25). In other words, we may get the first presupposition that someone other than the boss will come to the party from the consequent clause alone. In addition, we may get the second presupposition that Herb is not the boss from the whole sentence, i.e., the whole conditional sentence. It seems that this analysis can also apply to the explanation of the example (20).

Let us examine the following example with no conditional, discussed previously.

(26) *Sam* is having dinner in New York tonight, too. (= (18))

As we saw previously, the presupposition of (26) is that someone other than Sam is having dinner in New York tonight, on the usual view. This presupposition seems to be correct if we stick to the meaning of the whole sentence, disregarding other contextual considerations for this utterance. In other words, I can say that this presupposition is semantically adequate, though it may contain some problems on pragmatic aspects.

In connection with the semantic analysis of presupposition, let us consider the following example (27).

(27) Priscilla is eating supper, again. (= (19))

As we saw previously, on the usual view, the presupposition is that Priscilla has eaten supper before. It seems that this example does not cause any problem in relation to presupposition on semantic aspects.

### 4.3. Pragmatic Analysis

Stalnaker (1973) tries to account for the notion of presupposition on the basis of the pragmatic notion, as opposed to a purely semantic one. He argues that the presupposition relation cannot be explained solely in terms of the meaning or content of sentences, but must be explained partly in terms of facts about the users of sentences: their beliefs, intentions and expectations. He emphasizes that the linguistic phenomenon of presupposition should be explained in terms of intuitive ideas between a person and a proposition, not between propositions or sentences. He points out that the pragmatic account of presupposition gives a natural intuitive explanation for a rule which, on the semantic account, looks ad hoc.

Then, let us examine how pragmatic analysis may deal with presuppositional anaphora.

In connection with the examples (8–15) discussed previously, this pragmatic analysis does not cause any problem. For instance, the example (8), which has the factive verb *regret*, may have the presupposition mentioned there if the sentence is uttered in an adequate context. The example (9), which contains the perfective aspect, may have the presupposition mentioned there when it is uttered in an answer to a question, “Is Ivan still beating his wife?” The example (10), which contains the iterative expression *again*, may have the presupposition mentioned there in an answer to a question, “Did Andy meet with the PLO?” The example (11), which is a cleft sentence, may have the presupposition mentioned there in an answer to a question, “When did you leave Connecticut?” The example (12), which is a pseudo-cleft sentence, may have the presupposition mentioned there when it is uttered in an answer to the question, “Did John destroy something?” The example (13), which contains *too*, may have the presupposition mentioned there when it is uttered in an answer to the question, “What about Bill?” The example (14), which contains the quantifier *all*, may have the presupposition mentioned there when it is uttered in an answer to the question, “Are John's children awake?” The example (15), which has the referential expression *the king of France*, may also have the presupposition mentioned there when it is uttered in an answer to the question, “Where is the king of France?”

Next, let us examine the examples from Kripke (2009). First, consider the following example (28).

(28) If Herb comes to the party, *the boss* will come, too. (= (16))

In the usual view, the presupposition of the consequent is that someone other than the boss will come to the party. In Kripke's view, the presupposition of the consequent is that Herb is not the boss. It seems to me that both presuppositions exist in (28). In other words, a natural



explanation based on linguistic intuition seems to be that Herb is not the boss, and that someone other than the boss will come to the party. This explanation is based on the common belief between speakers and hearers in discourse. In this respect, a pragmatic explanation seems to have a merit in capturing the reason why the sentence (28) may have two presuppositions.

Pragmatic analysis of presuppositional anaphora does not raise any particular problems in accounting for the presuppositions of the examples (18), (19), and (20). These presuppositions seem to be natural consequences that take place when a speaker utters the sentences before his hearer in a given context. Above all, pragmatic analysis seems to have a strong point in accounting for possible multiple presuppositions that may take place in a sentence when it is uttered in a particular context. Note that in general, a sentence can have multiple presuppositions when it is uttered in a given context. In this respect, we should take all these facts into account when we try to establish a general theory of presuppositional anaphora.

So far, we have seen how some examples can be accounted for on the purely pragmatic aspect. We have seen that all the examples dealt with on semantic aspects can also be dealt with on the pragmatic aspect without any problems. In other words, some problematic sentences on semantic aspects can be accounted for when we take into account the context in which they are uttered in discourse. In this respect, we should account for the anaphora of presuppositions on pragmatic aspects, rather than on syntactic or semantic aspects. For this reason, I tentatively give the following syntactic anaphoric rules for presupposition.

(29) A Syntactic Anaphoric Rule for Presupposition

All syntactically presupposing structures must have their syntactic anaphoric antecedents.

The rule (29) may account for examples like (11–12), but has difficulty in explaining other examples discussed so far.

Next, I tentatively give the following semantic anaphoric rules for presupposition.

(30) A Semantic Anaphoric Rule for Presupposition

All lexical presuppositional anaphoric expressions must have their semantic antecedents.

The semantic anaphoric rule (30) above may be effective in accounting for examples like (8), (9), (10), (13), (14) and (15). The presuppositions in these examples occur due to particular meanings of some words in these sentences. However, the semantic anaphoric rule for presupposition in (30) above has difficulty in accounting for examples like (11–12), where presuppositions occur for structural reasons. Besides, it also has difficulty in accounting for examples like (28), where it may have multiple presuppositions, depending on the common belief between speakers and hearers in discourse. For this reason, we need pragmatic anaphoric rules for presupposition to account for examples like (28). I thus tentatively propose the following rule (31).

(31) A Pragmatic Anaphoric Rule for Presupposition

All pragmatic presuppositional anaphoric expressions must have their pragmatic antecedents in discourse when they are commonly believed to be presupposed by both speakers and hearers.

The rule (31) may be effective in accounting for examples like (28), which may have multiple presuppositions. Besides, this rule seems to work very well for all presuppositions which have their context in discourse. Then, should we have three different anaphoric rules for presupposition,

i.e., the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic rules? It seems that the syntactic and semantic anaphoric rules for presupposition can be included in the general pragmatic anaphoric rule (31). In this respect, I propose the following general anaphoric rules for presupposition in (32).

(32) Anaphoric Rules for Presupposition

- a. All presuppositional anaphoric expressions must have their pragmatic antecedents in discourse when they are commonly believed to be presupposed by both speakers and hearers.
- b. All presuppositional anaphoric expressions must have their syntactic and semantic antecedents only when they are independent of discourse.

The rules in (32) may effectively account for all the examples that have been discussed so far.

## 5. Conclusion

So far, we have examined various kinds of presuppositions. Some presuppositions are related to lexical meanings of words, while others are related to particular structures of sentences. Besides, some presuppositions are deeply related to pragmatic aspects. For this reason, they have multiple presuppositions in a sentence, depending on their context in discourse. Presuppositions related to both lexical meanings and structural characteristics can be dealt with by the semantic anaphoric rule for presupposition and the syntactic anaphoric rule for presupposition, respectively. On the contrary, presuppositions related to pragmatic aspects can be effectively accounted for by pragmatic anaphoric rules. However, the syntactic and semantic aspects are not independent of pragmatic ones.

In other words, we may regard the former as a part of the latter. For this reason, I have proposed unified anaphoric rules for presupposition. They captures the nature of presupposition relatively well. Therefore, later studies on anaphoric characteristics of presuppositions should be focused primarily on their pragmatic aspects.

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Abstract

## Presupposition and Rules for Anaphora

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Kripke (2009) points out that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements, and claims that we need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to the corresponding pronominal theory. However, he does not suggest any particular anaphora rules for presupposition. Some presuppositions are related to lexical meanings of particular words, while others are related to particular structures of sentences. Presuppositions related to both lexical meanings and structural characteristics can be dealt with by the semantic anaphoric rule and the syntactic anaphoric rule for presupposition, respectively. On the contrary, presuppositions related to pragmatic aspects can be accounted for by pragmatic anaphoric rules. However, the former are not independent of the latter. In other words, we may regard the former as a part of the latter. For this reason, I propose unified anaphoric rules for presupposition. They capture the nature of presupposition relatively well.

**Key Words:** presupposition, anaphora, anaphor, discourse, context, utterance

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