The Abortive Meeting: Habermas, Foucault and Enlightenment

Kyungjun Sung

Habermas and Foucault are the most discussed thinkers in British and American literary criticism, representing the Frankfurt School and poststructuralism. Concerning Enlightenment, they are regarded as the fatal foes whose guns take aims at each other's heart. In this sense, it could be said that Foucault's sudden death in June 1984 deprived us of one of the most historic meetings in the last part of 20th century. For in November of the same year, along with Habermas and other scholars such as Hubert Dreyfus and Richard Rorty, he was scheduled to hold a discussion of Enlightenment based on Kant's 200-year-old essay, "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?."("Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?") If that meeting had been held, it would have given us an explicit answer to Habermas and Foucault's agreements and divergences in terms of Enlightenment and modernity. The necessity of that abortive meeting is further enhanced by the fact that the debate about Enlightenment and modernity is one of the most controversial issues in 21th century.

However, it is fortunate we have some available texts from which we can presume to construct what the discussion would have been like. As is well known, around the abortive meeting in 1984, Foucault

* This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund of 2007
** College of English, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
and Habermas wrote respectively the essays and the book which directly deal with Enlightenment and modernity. They are Foucault's "What is Enlightenment?" and Habermas's "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present" and *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Habermas delivered a series of four lectures about Enlightenment at the College de France in March 1983, and published those lectures in an extended form in 1985 under the title of *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Foucault's "What is Enlightenment?", of which an excerpt was published in May 1984, was a response to Habermas's previous lectures on the philosophical discourse of modernity. After that, Foucault invited Habermas for a discussion on Enlightenment in the United States in 1984. Originally Foucault's "What is Enlightenment?" was to form a basis for this conference of Foucault, Habermas, and some other thinkers\(^1\). Yet, Foucault's sudden death caused that discussion to be cancelled. "Taking Aims at the Heart of the Present" is Habermas's writing in *memoriam* of Foucault's death, simultaneously estimating Foucault's "What is Enlightenment?". From these various circumstances, we can reconstruct the failed discussion from these three writings. Furthermore, the possibility of the reconstruction is heightened by the fact that each writing was written, taking aims at the other's writing. This article aims to examine these three writings and analyze precisely in what points Habermas and Foucault agree and where they diverge about Enlightenment. This work will make up the contour of the abortive meeting, thereby giving some insight to our contemporary unresolved debates on Enlightenment and modernity\(^2\).

---

1 Concerning the process of this abortive meeting, see Ehrhard Bahr 97.

2 Before starting this essay, I should accept one fact: this essay can not investigate Habermas's and Foucault's whole philosophy about Enlightenment. As is well known, concerning Foucault's attitude toward Enlightenment there are some differences between his early days and his late days, especially around the 1980's. It
Concerning their agreements, what is most conspicuous is that they agree on their estimation about Kant to some extent. In "What is Enlightenment?"\(^3\), as Habermas puts it, Foucault estimates Kant as the first philosopher "to take aim like an archer at the heart of a present... and thereby to inaugurate the discourse of modernity" (TAH 107). According to Foucault, first, Kant philosophically interrogates man's relation to the present for the first time in the history of philosophy; secondly, he has a critical attitude toward the present. Foucault recognizes this attitude of Kant's as "the attitude of modernity" (WE 38). In Foucault's conceptualization, modernity is the attitude of "philosophical interrogation--one that simultaneously problematizes man's relation to the present--to man's historical mode of being" (WE 41).

This philosophical conceptualization of Foucault's about Kant and Enlightenment is different from his previous judgement on them. As Habermas points out, in Foucault's works before the 1980s, modernity is characterized by the aporia that the cognitive subject pledges itself to the project of modernity that would demand infinite power. Therefore, "a subject, thus structurally strained to the limits, is enmeshed in an anthropocentric mode of knowledge. And this whole field is now occupied by the 'sciences of man', which Foucault perceives as an insidiously operating disciplinary force" (TAH 106). In a word, for Foucault, modern reason is nothing but a perverted and

---

3 "What is Enlightenment?" will be abbreviated as WE. Habermas’s “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present” and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity will be abbreviated as TAH and PDM respectively.
disguised will to power, and on the bottom of it lies Kant's philosophy. Regarding this change of Foucault's attitude, we can not easily say that the difference is his progress from the early philosophical discourse. However, it is evident that Foucault's attitude toward Enlightenment drastically changes. Habermas also expresses his surprise for this change in TAH:

How does such a singularly affirmative understanding of modern philosophizing, always directed to our own actuality and imprinted in the here-and-now, fit with Foucault's unyielding criticism of modernity? How can Foucault's self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition of Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable criticism of this very form of knowledge of modernity? . . . Using Kant as an example, didn't Foucault reveal in *The Order of Things* the peculiar dynamic of that will-to-truth which is stimulated anew by each frustration to an increased and in turn failed production of knowledge? (TAH 106)

It could be said that Habermas agrees with Foucault's estimation of Kant and Enlightenment. We can see it in TAH and *PDM*, particularly chapter 9, in which Habermas criticizes Foucault's attack on Kant and the knowledge of Enlightenment. According to Habermas, Kant is the first philosopher who "carried out his critique of reason from reason's own perspective" (*PDM* 302). Habermas maintains that by transforming thought into a diagnostic instrument, Kant intangles reason "in that turbulent process of self-assurance that forms the horizon of new historical consciousness which has kept modernity in constant motion until the present" (TAH 105). That is, Habermas, like Foucault, claims that modernity begins with Kant's attempt to make reason critical. In this respect, it is no wonder that Habermas, evaluating highly this change of Foucault's estimation about Kant and Enlightenment, places Foucault in this critical
tradition starting from Kant. Habermas and Foucault agree that, first, modernity begins with Kant; secondly, its essence is critical attitude toward the present--critical reason.

However, Habermas's emphasis on Kant is a little different from that of Foucault. For Habermas, Kant's modernity consists in his recognition of the limits of reason. According to Habermas, Kant's achievement in relation to Enlightenment consists in saving the critical and transcendental power of reason and thus the triumph of reason over superstition, custom, and despotism. Habermas insists Kant is "the precursor of Enlightenment" in that he preserved the primacy of reason as articulated in his enlightenment of critique. However, what is more important for Foucault is not Kant's attempt to illuminate the primacy of this critical use of reason. Of course in WE Foucault does not deny that Kant preserved the critical role of reason in the face of the collapse of metaphysics, but rather than emphasizing critical reason, Foucault's emphasizes that Kant is a diagnostician of a particular historical conjuncture. That is, what Foucault wants to focus on about Kant, is that, as Rabinow puts it, Kant is "an interpretive analyst of our current situation"(Rabinow 115) trying to diagnose the contemporary reality.

Concerning their agreement, Habermas agrees with Foucault's criticism on the dark aspect of Enlightenment to a considerable degree. Of course in the chapter 9 and 10 of PDM, Habermas criticizes the traps hidden in Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methodology and his adherence to power. Yet Habermas, as McCarthy points out, estimates that, "more than any other of the radical critics of reason, Foucault opens up a field of investigation for social research" and his works demystify social pathologies of modernity(14). Habermas accepts that in connection with humanitarian ideas of Enlightenment, there is "double movement of liberation and enslavement"(PDM 246) which Foucault later
recognizes along a broad front in the reforms of the penal system, the health establishment, social welfare, and so forth. Habermas agrees with Foucault in that modernity shows a very dark aspect, and "the paradigm of consciousness is exhausted" (McCarthy 17). He also recognizes that reason has become instrumental reason, "concretized in history, society, body, and language" (PDM 317). As White puts it, Habermas's description of the role of reification and expertise is very similar to Foucault's analysis of how the "discourses" associated with the growing organization of modern life create new ways of subjugating people, while ostensibly enhancing their freedom and well-being (113).

However, although Habermas accepts Foucault's criticism on the dark aspect of Enlightenment and never entirely rejects Foucault's critical perspective, he objects to Foucault's "totalization" of critique in the name of the "other of reason" (PDM 299). Habermas's criticism of Foucault's totalization can be summarized in two points. First, Foucault himself creates contradictions in using the tools of reason to criticize reason. That is to say, the concepts of meaning, validity, and value—regarded only as power effect by Foucault's genealogical critique—also haunt Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methodology in the forms of "presentism" and "relativism." Secondly, Foucault's criticism is based on his theory of power too much. According to Habermas, in Foucault's viewpoints, the essential phenomena of modern culture and society are "flattened down" onto the plane of power effect. In consequence it could be said that, although Habermas agrees with Foucault's criticism on the

---

4 In this sense Habermas compares Foucault's history to an iceberg composed of discourses and also ridicules power as a single hypothesis—"the only thing is power, which appears with ever new masks in the change of anonymous process of overpowering. Habermas says, "under the stoic gaze of the genealogist, history hardens into an iceberg covered with the crystalline forms of arbitrary formations of discourses. See PDM 253."
dark aspect of Enlightenment, he simultaneously criticizes the traps of Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methodology and his addiction to the power relation. As Bahr puts it, whereas Habermas admits ardently "the undeniable achievements as well as the palpable distortions in the process of Enlightenment,”(Bahr 99) Foucault is niggardly in accepting the achievements of Enlightenment. Foucault never criticizes the achievements of Enlightenment directly, but is also unwilling to estimate them properly. The following statement from WE clearly demonstrates this:

This ethos implies, first, the refusal of what I like to call the "blackmail" of Enlightenment . . . I also think that as an enterprise for linking the progress of truth and the history of liberty in a bond of direct relation, it formulated a philosophical question that remains for us to consider . . . . I am inclined to see Enlightenment and humanism in a state of tension rather than identity. (WE 42-3)

How hesitating Foucault's attitude toward the achievements of Enlightenment is! This is the point where Foucault diverges from Habermas toward the achievements of Enlightenment.

Nevertheless, it is evident that Foucault and Habermas agree that Enlightenment is an "unfinished project"(this is the third crucial point of their agreement). As is well known, Habermas always claims the "incomplete project" of Enlightenment (1983 3). Habermas's insistence on incomplete Enlightenment is obviously represented in his motive of writing PDM. Until 1983, Habermas had not dealt with French structuralism and poststructuralism in detail in his works. However, according to Bahr, as French poststructuralism began to dominate the theoretical discourses in West Germany, Habermas could no longer overlook what he perceived as a neoconservative attack on Enlightenment as the "uncompleted project of modernity" and as an emancipatory learning process. In particular, what
Habermas can least endure, is their attempt to deactivate the emancipatory contents of Enlightenment by seeing it as exhausted or repressive (Bahr 99). *PDM* is the work with which Habermas copes with the attack from poststructuralism. According to Habermas, their totalized critique of reason is, as discussed above, the attempt to undercut the capacity of reason to be critical. In *PDM*, as McCarthy points out, the strategy Habermas chooses in order to carry on the "incomplete project of Enlightenment", is "to return to the counterdiscourse of modernity in which the principle of a self-sufficient, self-assertive subjectivity was exposed to telling criticism and a 'counterreckoning' of the cost of modernity was drawn up" (McCarthy 15). For Habermas, the problem of the Enlightenment can be solved only by the advance of Enlightenment. It is at this point that Habermas claims an intersubjective rationality based on the communicative action.

In this respect, Habermas is what McCarthy calls "Hegelian." He follows Hegel when he looks upon reason as a healing power of unification and reconciliation. However, it is not the Absolute that Habermas has in mind, but the uncoerced intersubjectivity of rational agreement. He also follows Marx in that he claims that philosophy must be practical. However, the social practice that Habermas has in mind cannot be identified with Marx's conception of labor, but the communicative practice of everyday life (McCarthy 16).

Compared with Habermas, Foucault never follows Habermas's claims on communicative action or intersubjective rationality in *WE*. Yet, as far as the claims on the unfinished project of Enlightenment are concerned, Foucault's similarity to Habermas is evident in *WE*. It is clearly revealed when Foucault looks upon Enlightenment as "this permanent critique of ourselves" (*WE* 43). It is the case that Foucault is still looking at Enlightenment skeptically, thinking that Enlightenment "as a set of political, economic, social, institutional,
and cultural events" is always "a privileged domain for analysis"(WE 42). Nonetheless, Foucault agrees that Enlightenment is an unfinished project in Habermas's terms. The following demonstrates this attitude of Foucault's:\(^5\):

the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (WE 50)

According to Foucault, the critical attitude of Enlightenment is "a possible transgression of these limitations,"(45) and is also a "seeking to give new impetus, as far as possible, to the undefined work of freedom"(46). "Enlightenment is," Foucault says, "the permanent reactivation of an attitude--that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era"(42). In this sense, it could be said that Habermas and Foucault agree that Enlightenment is still "an incomplete or permanent project" worth pursuing, notwithstanding the various dangers of manipulation, coercion, terror, and destruction, as articulated by Horkheimer and Adorno in *The dialectic of Enlightenment*.

In this sense it is not surprising that some scholars look upon Foucault as the defender of Enlightenment. Bahr is one case. Exemplifying Foucault's attitude toward the unfinished project of Enlightenment in WE, Bahr insists that Foucault is the defender of Enlightenment, and he develops a new concept, "permanent Enlightenment"(102). Moreover, he maintains that Foucault's proximity to the Frankfurt School and Habermas becomes most obvious at the point when he defines modernity "as a permanent critique of our historical area"(WE 42). According to Bahr, Foucault's

\(^5\) This attitude is very different from the claims shown in the previous works which reveal only the inhumane aspects of Enlightenment through archaeological and genealogical methodology.
choice of Kant's historic essay "constitutes his break with recent poststructuralism and close alliance with the German Enlightenment tradition and German critical theory"(102). The following quotation evidently demonstrates Bahr's attitude:

it is regrettable that Habermas found no other way of appreciating Foucault's development than explaining it in terms of a contradiction, albeit an "instructive contradiction." Foucault could have been a worthy, if not formidable, ally to his cause in the present debate about historiography and about the new irrationalism in West Germany. (107)

Therefore, Bahr asserts that Foucault's place is "on the side of Habermas in defence of Enlightenment," articulating the opinion that the promise of Enlightenment has yet to be fulfilled6 (Bahr, 108).

As indicated before, it is the case that Foucault reevaluates the critical attitude of Enlightenment and claims on "incomplete project of Enlightenment" in WE. But can Foucault be on the side of Habermas in defence of Enlightenment? Examining WE more closely, Foucault shows very clear disagreement with Habermas in relation to Enlightenment. The primary disagreement is evidenced in the scope of their solution to the problems of Enlightenment. In WE he never accepts the universal solution of the problems. He continuously stresses "partial and local inquiry or test" and "the partial transformation"(WE 47-48). In order to solve the problems of reality Foucault emphasizes only partial and local inquiry "to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take"(WE 46). He rejects all the

6 Exemplifying this essay of Foucault's, Rabinow also reverberates the same opinion. He insists that Foucault is the defender of Enlightenment and, in a sense, more legitimate successor of Enlightenment than Habermas, criticizing Habermas's attack on Foucault, See Rabinow and Dreyfus 116-21.
utopian solutions, and turns away "from all projects that claim to be global or radical" (WE 46). He even warns against the solution based on the level of universality. The following shows his attitude:

In fact we know from the experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous tradition. (WE 46)

Certainly, Foucault accepts the possibility that if "we limit ourselves to this type of always partial and local inquiry or test," we can "run the risk of letting ourselves be determined by more general structures of which we may well not be conscious, and over which we may have no control" (WE 47). Yet in spite of this danger, Foucault, claiming that this partial inquiry also "has its own generality, its systemacity, its homogeneniety, and its stakes," confesses that he "prefers even these partial transformations" in relation of historical analysis and the practical attitude (WE 47).

This scope implied in Foucault's solution is contrasted with the implications of communicative action presented by Habermas as the solution of the dark side of Enlightenment. Communicative action based on intersubjectivity is the solution on the level of society, not the partial level. According to Habermas, the reason expressed in communicative action is "mediated with the traditions, social practices, and body-centered complexes of experience, that coalesce into particular totalities" (PDM 316). Therefore, the solution through communicative action happens on the social level. Habermas says:

I would like to insist that . . . communicative reason is directly implicated in social life-processes insofar as acts of mutual understanding take on the role of a mechanism for coordinating action. (PDM 316)
In this sense Habermas's scope is basically different from Foucault's because, although Habermas never ignores the individual level, his solution must happen on the communal and social level.

In relation to the difference of the scope of their solutions, Foucault is different from Habermas concerning their philosophical attitude toward universality. Habermas's attitude toward universality is revealed in his philosophical thought about "validity claim" he continuously insists on about Enlightenment. According to Habermas, the validity claim "transcends spaces and times" (PDM 322). Therefore, the validity claim is distinguished from the social currency of a *de facto* established practice, and serves as "the foundation of an existing consensus" (PDM 322). It is a logical conclusion that Habermas cannot accept a concept of truth that is grounded on power, because such a claim implies that all norms and standards are ultimately relative. As Hohendahl points out, for Habermas, the universal concept of truth cannot be derived from the relative concept such as power relations (60-1).

Habermas's philosophical attitude toward universality is contrasted with Foucault's in WE. In the essay, Foucault indicates that universality must be replaced by contingency and arbitrariness. He says:

in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraint? (WE 45)

As a result, Foucault emphasizes repeatedly that the critical attitude of Enlightenment must never assume universality:

that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, . . . this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics
possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method." (WE 46)

In this sense Foucault puts the starting point of "the local and partial inquiry" above mentioned on personal experience. Foucault's refusal of universality is different from Habermas's philosophy claiming validity or a universal solution of contemporary reality through communicative rationality. That is, Habermas and Foucault show the crucial difference in two respects: first, in the scope of solution to the dark side of Enlightenment; secondly, in their attitude toward universality. Concerning their divergences, the most conspicuous is that they have different philosophies about the relation between the subject and society. For Habermas, the subject finds his identity and the solution of the problem of Enlightenment in the context of intersubjectivity through communicative action. According to him, with linguistically generated intersubjectivity "the ego stands within an interpersonal relationship that allows him to relate to himself as a participant in an interaction from the perspective of alter" (PDM 315). In Habermas's theory of communicative action, the feedback process by which life-world and everyday communicative practice are intertwined takes over the "mediating role that Marx and Western Marxism had reserved to social practice" (PDM 316). Therefore, agreement arrived at through communicative action, which is measured by the intersubjective recognition of universalistic validity claims, makes possible a networking of social interactions. That is, Habermas always recognizes the subject in the context of intersubjectivity or social network, and finds the solution of the problems of the subject in social context.

Habermas's concept of intersubjectivity is very different from Foucault's conception of the relation between the subject and society.
Before the 1980's, for Foucault, the subject is only a composite of discourses manipulated by power. However, in WE Foucault's recognition of the subject is more advanced: the subject tends to be looked upon as a "free being" or "autonomous subject" compared with the subject which he has conceptualized. Moreover, in this essay, he claims that "men are at once elements and agents of a single process" (WE 35). In this respect we can say that in WE Foucault's philosophy about the subject assumes more active meaning than the previous times.

Nonetheless, in WE his concept of the subject never goes beyond the level of the subject itself: his subject never admits the traces of Habermas's intersubjectivity. This attitude of Foucault's is evident in his conceptualization of Baudelaire. In WE Foucault estimates that Baudelaire has an ideal attitude of modernity in that he has the attitude of "desperate eagerness to imagine it, otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it, but by grasping it in what it is" (WE 41). Furthermore, Foucault, following Baudelaire's philosophical attitude, regards Constantin Guy, whom Baudelaire estimated as an ideal modern man, as "an example of modernity".

According to Foucault, Guy is the modern painter par excellence in that, "just when the whole world is falling asleep, he begins to work, and he transfigures that world. His transfiguration does not entail an annulling of reality, but a difficult interplay between the truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom". In other words, as far as Foucault is concerned, although modernity is the critical attitude to

---

7 Concerning Foucault's conceptualization of the subject before the 1980's Habermas indicates that in Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methodology the subject, like history, turns into a plurality of irregularly emerging and disappearing islands of discourses (PDM 249-53).

8 "Moreover, in "The Subject and Power" Foucault admits that the subject can be a subject of resistance toward the power totalizing and manipulating the subject. Let us pay attention to the fact that this essay was published in 1983."
the present, "it is also a mode of relationship that has to be established with only himself"(41). It means that, for Foucault, his criticism and concerns regarding Enlightenment always return to "only himself," i.e., only to the level of the subject itself.

Therefore, it is a logical conclusion that Foucault thinks the attitude of modernity is "to take oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration"(WE 41). According to Foucault, the ideal man of modernity is the dandy "who makes of his body, his behavior, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art"(41). In a word, for Foucault, man of modernity is "the man who tries to invent himself"(WE 42) and, as White puts it, this elaboration of the self is produced by attention to the body, pleasures and aesthetic form, not by attention to the social, or political realms(White 146). At this point it becomes obvious that Foucault never brings the existence of the subject into any coherent relationship with forms of collective political action. Foucault cuts off any access to intersubjective otherness.

Foucault's philosophical attitude toward Baudelaire is contrasted with Habermas's. As is well known, Habermas, like Foucault, regards Baudelaire as the model of modernity. He also sees the work of Baudelaire as the first clear manifestation of modern consciousness. According to Habermas, implied in Baudelaire's works is an "unbounding of subjectivity," that is, what White calls a "willingness to transgress the normal"(White 148). In a word, Habermas thinks that this aesthetic consciousness of Baudelaire's means transgression and criticism to the present. However, Habermas insists that it can spread into the social level through the learning process based on

---

9 “In this sense White could be right when he maintains that Foucault's conceptualization of modernity lies on "aesthetics of existence" in that it has at its core an idea of self-control, and the primary criterion is the will "to live an beautiful life and to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence." See White 150-1.
communicative action. That is to say, as White points out, for Habermas, "it becomes the experience of the social level through the communicative action" (White 150). It is at this point that Habermas and Foucault demonstrate their essential difference in their philosophies about the relation between subject and society.

Consequently, it could be said that in WE Foucault reevaluates Enlightenment and, like Habermas, accepts many merits of Enlightenment, for example, "the concerns for the present and the critical attitude to the present." However, Foucault's subject always remains only in the subject level, refusing any kinds of communal and intersubjective solution through communicative action, whereas Habermas emphasizes this very "intersubjectivite solution" through mutual understanding and reciprocal recognition. Presumably, this point would be their essential disagreement about Enlightenment in their abortive meeting.
Works Cited


Hohendahl, Peter U. "Habermas's *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.*" *Telos* 69 (Fall 1986): 58-73.

Abstract

The Abortive Meeting: Habermas, Foucault and Enlightenment

Kyungjun Sung

This article aims to investigate in what points Habermas and Foucault agree and where they diverge about Enlightenment, trying to construct what the abortive meeting in 1984 would have been like, if it had been held. I examine especially their three writings about Enlightenment and modernity around the abortive meeting, that is, "What is Enlightenment?" "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present" and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.

Habermas and Foucault agree that, first, modernity begins with Kant; secondly, its essence is critical attitude toward the present--critical reason. It could be said that, although Habermas agrees with Foucault's criticism on the dark aspect of Enlightenment, he simultaneously criticizes the traps of Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methodology and his addiction to the power relation. Whereas Habermas admits ardently the achievements and distortions of Enlightenment, Foucault is niggardly in accepting the achievements of Enlightenment. It is also evident that Foucault and Habermas agree that Enlightenment is an "unfinished project." Foucault reevaluates the critical attitude of Enlightenment and agrees with "incomplete project of Enlightenment" in "What is Enlightenment?".

However, their divergence is evident in the scope of their solution to the problems of Enlightenment. Foucault never accepts the universal solution of the problems and stresses the partial transformation while Habermas emphasizes communicative action based on
intersubjectivity, which implies the solution on the level of society. Foucault's philosophical attitude toward universality is also contrasted with Habermas's. Foucault indicates that universality must be replaced by contingency and arbitrariness while Habermas insists on the validity or a universal solution. The most conspicuous in their divergences is that they have different philosophies about the relation between the subject and society. For Habermas, the subject finds his identity in the context of intersubjectivity through communicative action, but Foucault's concept of the subject never goes beyond the level of the subject itself.

**Key words**: Habermas, Foucault, Enlightenment, Modernity, Subject